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ABSTRACT
We use a machine learning technique to assess whether the thematic con-
tent of financial statement disclosures (labeled topic) is incrementally infor-
mative in predicting intentional misreporting. Using a Bayesian topic mod-
eling algorithm, we determine and empirically quantify the topic content of
a large collection of 10-K narratives spanning 1994 to 2012. We find that the
algorithm produces a valid set of semantically meaningful topics that pre-
dict financial misreporting, based on samples of Securities and Exchange
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Commission (SEC) enforcement actions (Accounting and Auditing Enforce-
ment Releases [AAERs]) and irregularities identified from financial restate-
ments and 10-K filing amendments. Our out-of-sample tests indicate that topic
significantly improves the detection of financial misreporting by as much as
59% when added to models based on commonly used financial and textual
style variables. Furthermore, models that incorporate topic significantly out-
perform traditional models when detecting serious revenue recognition and
core expense errors. Taken together, our results suggest that the topics dis-
cussed in annual report filings and the attention devoted to each topic are
useful signals in detecting financial misreporting.
JEL codes: C80; K22; K42; M40; M41; M48
Keywords: topic modeling; disclosure; latent Dirichlet allocation; financial
misreporting
1. Introduction
This study investigates whether a novel text-based measure of the thematic
content of financial statement disclosures (labeled as topic) is useful for
detecting financial misreporting.1 Detection models have long focused on
quantitative financial statement and stock market variables as predictive fac-
tors (Beneish [1997], Brazel, Jones, and Zimbelman [2009], Dechow et al.
[2011], Bao et al. [2020]). One drawback of this approach is that financial
misreporting can go undetected for multiple periods, because misreport-
ing firms often manipulate performance metrics and accounting transac-
tions to blend in better with their peers or the firm’s own past performance
(Lewis [2013]). To address this weakness, recent studies analyze the textual
and linguistic features of management disclosures, finding that summary
measures of these features serve as useful warnings of misreporting (see,
e.g., Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatachalam [2012], Larcker and Zakolyukina
[2012], Purda and Skillicorn [2015]).
Despite the usefulness of communication style in revealing misreport-
ing, the literature debates whether textual and linguistic features ade-
quately capture managers’ deliberate attempts to obfuscate or manipu-
late financial information (Bloomfield [2008], Bushee, Gow, and Taylor
[2018]). Further, as Loughran and McDonald [2016] highlight, commonly
used textual measures do not reflect the context or meaning of manage-
ment disclosures, thereby limiting the inferences that can be drawn. We
tackle these issues by introducing a machine learning tool that simultane-
ously detects and quantifies the thematic content (topic) of annual report
1We use the terms misreporting and misrepresentation interchangeably to refer to deliberate
violations of financial accounting standards and noncompliance with regulatory financial re-
porting rules. We refrain from using the term fraud because, in a legal sense, violations of
or noncompliance with financial reporting standards and rules are considered fraudulent
only if market participants rely on the misreported or misrepresented information to their
detriment.
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narratives. This approach departs from prior text-based research by focus-
ing on what is being disclosed by management rather than how. Using this
unique measure, we evaluate the disclosure topics associated with misre-
porting and how these topics evolve. More importantly, we investigate the
incremental predictive power of topic in detecting misreporting out of sam-
ple, relative to a collection of financial and textual style measures.
Our focus on the thematic content of financial statement filings draws on
the management disclosure and communications literatures. These bod-
ies of research suggest that the flexible nature of disclosure content allows
for a broader set of dimensions along which annual report narratives can
be used to identify financial misreporting, compared to quantitative finan-
cial metrics and summary measures of textual features (Hoberg and Lewis
[2017]). These literatures also argue that textual features, such as tone and
word usage, are difficult to classify as deceptive, because disclosure narra-
tives can be influenced by individuals’ expectations and motivations, even
when the intent is to communicate objectively and truthfully (Douglas and
Sutton [2003]). In that sense, the content of the disclosure and the atten-
tion devoted to each topic may better predict misreporting than how the
narrative is fashioned. We therefore examine whether the topic content of
financial statement disclosures is incrementally informative in assessing the
likelihood of misreporting, beyond textual style features. We also analyze
the ability of topic to detect misreporting, relative to quantitative financial
variables, given that these measures are typically backward-looking and less
efficient in predicting misreporting, compared to language-based measures
(Cecchini et al. [2010a], Goel and Gangolly [2012], Larcker and Zakolyuk-
ina [2012], Purda and Skillicorn [2015]).
We generate our topic measure by employing a Bayesian topic model-
ing algorithm developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan [2003], termed Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). Similar to factor or cluster analysis, LDA is an
unsupervised and unstructured probabilistic model that “learns” or discov-
ers the latent thematic structure of words within a corpus of documents.2
The algorithm (and other variants) is widely used in practice by Internet
search engines to guide keyword selection and improve correlations be-
tween search terms and web content (Fishkin [2014]). A unique advantage
of LDA is that it does not require predetermined word dictionaries or topic
categories and instead relies on the fact that words frequently appearing
together tend to be semantically related. This process reduces researcher
bias, as foreknowledge of document content does not affect the topic clas-
sifications.3 Furthermore, the algorithm can classify the content of large
2 LDA is a “bag of words” algorithm that uses the distribution of words across documents to
classify and quantify themes without the need for predefined or researcher-determined word
lists or topic categories.
3 Although LDA is unsupervised and does not rely on human input to identify topics, hu-
man judgment is necessary to interpret and label the topics inferred from the algorithm.
This is because the LDA output for a given topic consists only of word clusters and word
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collections of textual narratives—a task that would be otherwise impracti-
cal with large samples of financial statement filings.
We derive our topic measure using a comprehensive sample of 131,528
10-K filings issued by U.S. firms from 1994 to 2012 (based on the electronic
filing date). The full text of each 10-K filing is retrieved from the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR system and parsed following
the procedures in Li [2008]. We run the LDA algorithm on the parsed fil-
ings using rolling five-year windows over our sample period. This time-series
approach allows the topic categories to evolve, as we expect time-varying
factors to influence management communications as well as the ability of
thematic content to detect financial misreporting. The topics discovered
in each five-year window are then used to compute the proportion of each
topic discussed in 10-K filings issued in the subsequent year.
We use three data sources to identify instances of intentional misre-
porting. This multiple-pronged sampling approach follows from Karpoff
et al. [2017, KKLM], who demonstrate the importance of evaluating em-
pirical inferences drawn from different data sources of financial misreport-
ing. Our first data source is a comprehensive database of SEC Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), developed by Dechow et al.
[2011] and compiled by the University of California at Berkeley’s Center
for Financial Reporting and Management (CFRM). The data set provides
details on firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for alleged account-
ing or auditing violations and the pertinent reporting periods. We use this
information to identify the 10-K filings affected by the violations.
We rely on financial restatements and amended annual filings (10-K/As)
as two additional sources of intentional misreporting. We broadly refer to
these forms of intentional misreporting as irregularities. We gather restate-
ments from Audit Analytics (AA) and capture irregularities by screening
the data for restatements categorized as “fraudulent” or “nonclerical” or
those associated with a regulatory investigation, following the classification
method in Karpoff et al. [2017, KKLM]. We conduct an automated text
search of 10-K/As for material misrepresentations or omissions that are
seemingly intentional. Using the criteria in Hennes, Leone, and Miller
[2008, HLM], we classify the original 10-K filing as misreported if our
search tool identifies the following in the filing amendment: (1) variants of
the words “fraud” or “irregularity” in describing the filing revision and (2)
references to revisions stemming from investigations by the SEC, U.S. De-
partment of Justice (DOJ), or independent parties. Although this process
relies on a single disclosure source, the irregularities gathered from 10-
K/As are valuable, as they capture a broad set of financial reporting prob-
lems.
There is significant overlap between our three data sources, though each
sample has advantages and disadvantages. Misreporting events drawn from
probabilities (also referred to as word weightings). Thus, some amount of discretion is un-
avoidable when applying LDA.
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AAERs provide researchers with high confidence of intentional misreport-
ing, because the SEC targets firms when there is strong evidence of intent
to mislead (Dechow et al. [2011], KKLM). Indeed, a benchmarking anal-
ysis by KKLM finds that AAERs fare the best in capturing price-moving
events related to financial misconduct. The AAER data also outperform
restatement samples in identifying infractions that meet the statutory def-
inition of securities fraud. However, one drawback is that many instances
of misreporting are not pursued by the SEC, due to resource constraints
(Files [2012]). Another shortcoming is that cases pursued may reflect se-
lection biases arising from the SEC’s evaluation and investigation processes.
Our irregularity samples mitigate these limitations, because the events are
drawn from broader sources. These samples could, however, introduce
other selection or identification issues as the procedures for gathering
these data depend on how firms disclose and discuss misreporting events in
filings.4
We first evaluate the semantic validity of the LDA output and the abil-
ity of the topic categories to detect misreporting in samples on an an-
nual basis. Using both human and machine-based procedures, we find that
LDA produces a coherent set of semantically meaningful topics that cap-
ture the economic content of annual report filings. These topics capture
content referring to firm performance, complex transactions, financing ar-
rangements, and risk factors. Interestingly, the discussion of particular top-
ics evolves, indicating that the content of management communications is
quite fluid. Our in-sample tests indicate that several topics are consistently
associated with misreporting across our three samples. For instance, we find
that misreporting firms devote more attention to discussing increases in fi-
nancial performance and business activities, such as mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As) and share capital transactions, that arguably create incentives
to misreport (Hoberg and Lewis [2017]). Misreporting firms, on the other
hand, allocate less attention to discussing issues related to risk factors, cost
commitments, and credit agreements.
Our next analyses assess the usefulness of topic in detecting misreporting
out of sample, compared to a comprehensive set of quantitative financial
and textual style variables. The financial variables stem from an expanded
version of the Dechow et al. [2011] F-score model, whereas the textual
variables (denoted Style) cover various measures of textual complexity,
language voice, and disclosure tone. Our detection process is real time, as
we apply a rolling five-year prediction approach, similar to the time-series
method used to generate the LDA topics. We find that topic provides signif-
icant incremental predictive power over our collection of F-score and Style
variables. Models that incorporate topic outperform standalone or joint
models of F-score and Style, depending on the type of misreporting event.
4 A limitation that is common to all three samples is that each data source may provide an
incomplete history or sequence of events that constitutes a case of misreporting (KKLM).
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When we evaluate the interplay between all three sets of predictors, we
find that a joint model of topic and F-score best predicts misreporting in the
AAER and AA samples, whereas a joint model of topic and Style best predicts
misreporting in the 10-K/A sample. This differential result indicates that
disclosure topics and financial metrics complement each other in detecting
misreporting that prompts an SEC action or a restatement, whereas topic-
and style-based information is more useful in identifying broad financial
reporting problems.
Additional tests of the classification accuracy of our models indicate that
topic improves the classification of high-risk cases of misreporting in the
AAER (AA) samples by as much as 59% (50%) when added to models based
solely on financial and textual style variables. The economic value of topic is
more modest in our 10-K/A sample, with a 6% increase in classification ac-
curacy for high-risk cases. We also find that topic significantly improves the
detection of serious revenue-recognition and core-expense errors. Sensitiv-
ity checks indicate that our results are unaffected by fluctuations in misre-
porting over time and are not driven by firms with repeated misreporting
events. Our inferences are also robust to an expanded set of financial and
textual style measures and to topics derived solely from the Management
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report.
Our study makes several important contributions. First, we extend the
literature by documenting that the topics discussed in annual report filings
are useful for identifying intentional misreporting, either on a standalone
basis or in combination with standard prediction variables. Second, we ex-
pand burgeoning research that examines the thematic content of financial
disclosure narratives (e.g., Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence [2017], Huang
et al. [2018]). We exploit a robust machine learning tool that quantifies
what is being disclosed in annual financial reports (as opposed to how). This
content analysis is a significant step forward, as it delves deeper into the
semantic meaning of management disclosures and how disclosure themes
point to misreporting. Further, our real-time prediction method considers
the time-varying and fluid nature of management communications, which
contrasts with prior work based on word dictionaries, which are fairly static
and easily identifiable by firms.
Lastly, our study has important practical implications for regulators and
corporate monitors, who have begun to implement text-based initiatives
aimed at detecting financial misrepresentation. For instance, the SEC
has developed computer-powered risk assessments that leverage text-based
tools, such as word dictionaries and topic modeling, to detect anomalies in
firm disclosures (Eaglesham [2013], Bauguess [2018]). Auditors are sim-
ilarly employing textual analytics to identify reporting risks (Murphy and
Tysiac [2015]). Our study suggests that extracting disclosure themes from
corporate filings helps capture financial misdeeds.5
5 Regulators and monitors should note that topic analysis is less susceptible to “gaming,”
relative to other text-based measures, as the words in any topic category and the associated
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2. Background and Research Questions
2.1 PREDICTING FINANCIAL MISREPORTING
Over the past two decades, researchers have sought to identify a parsi-
monious set of predictors of financial misreporting. Research documents
that measures of extreme or abnormal financial performance are useful
predictors of misreporting. For instance, studies find that misreporting
firms exhibit high abnormal accruals, disproportionate increases in receiv-
ables and inventories, and poor abnormal market performance (Feroz,
Park, and Pastena [1991], Beneish [1997, 1999]). In addition, studies sug-
gest that misreporting is associated with stock and debt market pressures
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996]) and weaknesses in firms’ internal
governance or monitoring (Beasley [1996], Beasley et al. [2000], Farber
[2005]).
Drawing from this literature, Dechow et al. [2011] conduct a compre-
hensive analysis of the quantitative financial and stock characteristics of
misreporting firms identified in AAERs. They find that AAER firms have
low-quality accruals, deteriorating financial and nonfinancial performance,
and high stock valuations, relative to fundamentals. AAER firms are also
more likely to engage in aggressive off-balance-sheet and financing activi-
ties during the misstatement period. Using these characteristics, Dechow
et al. [2011] develop a composite prediction measure (F-score) that out-
performs traditional accrual measures in detecting misreporting. However,
despite this added performance, studies argue that the predictive ability
of quantitative characteristics is quite modest (Larcker and Zakolyukina
[2012]), with many of the measures behaving opposite to conventional wis-
dom (Purda and Skillicorn [2015]). To address this weakness, recent re-
search explores the predictive value of various language-based measures.
The premise is that the linguistic features of management disclosures re-
veal communication patterns that foretell financial misreporting. This lit-
erature relies on two general approaches to uncover and analyze commu-
nication patterns in written disclosures (see Li [2010b] and Loughran and
McDonald [2016] for reviews of these methodologies.)
The first approach relies on predefined word categorizations (or dictio-
naries) to investigate the link between intentional misreporting and lan-
guage tone as well as deception cues. For instance, Li [2008] finds that
the relative frequency of self-reference words, causation words, positive
emotion words, and future tense verbs within the MD&A section of 10-K
filings is associated with managerial obfuscation. Loughran and McDon-
ald [2011] find that negative and uncertain language in 10-K filings is
linked to securities lawsuits of alleged accounting improprieties, whereas
Rogers, Buskirk, and Zechman [2011] report that firms sued for financial
weightings are part of an interdependent system. Thus, gaming topic analysis would require a
complex and evolving unraveling system.
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misreporting use more optimistic language in their earnings announce-
ments. Finally, Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012] analyze conference call
transcripts and find that deceptive language, such as emotion words and
anxiety words, better predicts misreporting, compared to abnormal accrual
measures.
The second approach employs machine learning algorithms to discrim-
inate between “bags of words” or textual style markers that predict inten-
tional misreporting. These markers include textual features, such as verbal
complexity, readability, and disclosure tone, as well as grammar and word
choices. Among these studies, Cecchini et al. [2010a], Goel et al. [2010],
and Purda and Skillicorn [2015] are most relevant to our research. All three
studies use a supervised learning algorithm, termed the Support Vector
Machine (SVM), to classify misreporting events. The SVM tool improves
upon prior work, as it learns by example and does not require predefined
language markers. For instance, Purda and Skillicorn [2015] apply an SVM
to detect misreporting based on word usage in both annual and quarterly
filings. They find that an SVM-generated word dictionary outperforms pre-
diction models built using predefined dictionaries as well as models based
on quantitative financial measures.
Despite advances in the literature regarding the use of language-based
cues and textual markers to detect financial misreporting, there is little
research that incorporates the deeper semantic meaning of management
communications when assessing the likelihood of misreporting. Simply put,
there is scant evidence on whether what managers choose to discuss pre-
dicts misreporting. Our study addresses this gap in the literature by using a
state-of-the-art topic analysis tool to capture the thematic content of annual
report narratives.
2.2 LDA TOPIC MODELING
We employ a topic modeling approach developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan
[2003], termed LDA, to capture the thematic content of annual financial
reports. The LDA technique is widely used in the linguistic and information
retrieval literatures to identify the thematic structure of text corpora and
other collections of discrete disclosure data. (See Blei [2012] for a review
of topic modeling and its applications.) We use this approach to construct
a firm-specific measure (topic) of the topics discussed in annual financial
statements in a given reporting year. This unique measure (defined as the
normalized percentage of the annual report attributed to each topic iden-
tified by the algorithm) captures the extent to which a particular topic is
discussed within a given annual report filing.
Topic modeling is relatively new to accounting and finance (see
Loughran and McDonald [2016] and Eickhoff and Neuss [2017] for lit-
erature reviews), and our measurement approach is consistent with recent
studies that use LDA to investigate various financial reporting and capital
market phenomena. For instance, LDA has been used to examine (1) the
link between stock market movements and topics frequently searched by
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internet users (Curme et al. [2014]), (2) the thematic content of analyst
reports and conference call narratives (Huang et al. [2018]), (3) the types
of risks discussed in 10-K filings and how these discussions influence in-
vestors’ risk perceptions (Bao and Datta [2014]), and (4) the topics that
contribute to increases in 10-K length over time (Dyer, Lang, and Stice-
Lawrence [2017]).
More closely related to our study, Hoberg and Lewis [2017] use LDA
to examine whether misreporting firms provide abnormal MD&A disclo-
sures and the underlying incentives for this behavior. Hoberg and Lewis
[2017] find that, relative to industry peers, AAER firms disclose abnormal
content that is common among misreporting firms. Their topic analysis in-
dicates that AAER firms are more likely to grandstandmanipulated revenue
and R&D expense performance during misreporting years, while providing
fewer quantitative details about their financial results. This evidence is con-
sistent with incentives for misreporting firms to tout strong performance
and growth options, while concealing broad performance details. AAER
firms also under disclose topics related to liquidity challenges, perhaps to
mitigate negative cost-of-capital effects. Lastly, Hoberg and Lewis [2017]
find that managers disassociate themselves from the firm during misreport-
ing years by disclosing abnormally low levels of content referencing their
participation in the firm’s vision and strategy.
Our study differs from Hoberg and Lewis [2017] in several respects.
First, we move beyond disclosure incentives to demonstrate the incremen-
tal predictive power of thematic content in detecting misreporting within
the broader population of financial statement filers. As a result, our study
seeks to provide new insights into the benefits of statistical topic analysis in
assessing the likelihood of misreporting. Second, Hoberg and Lewis [2017]
fit their LDA model using annual reports filed in only the first year of
their sample period (1997). This approach does not account for changes
in disclosure topics over time and likely induces staleness in the topics
used in their analyses. As highlighted elsewhere (Cecchini et al. [2010a],
Li [2010b], Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence [2017]), accounting for tem-
poral variations in managerial communication is an important and much
needed extension of current text-based methodologies. We therefore ex-
tend Hoberg and Lewis [2017] by employing a rolling-window estimation
procedure that accounts for the time-varying nature of the topics discussed
by management. We use the same rolling-window setup to predict misre-
porting in real time using the topics identified in the window immediately
preceding the prediction period.
Lastly, the analysis of Hoberg and Lewis [2017] is confined to the MD&A
section, whereas our study considers the thematic content of the entire 10-K
filing. Although the MD&A section provides a useful setting for examining
disclosure content, it does not capture topics discussed elsewhere in the
annual report (Li [2010b]). Moreover, a major drawback of focusing on
only one section of the annual report is that companies can strategically
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shift or (de-)emphasize content across multiple sections (Loughran and
McDonald [2016]).6
2.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our research questions explore the incremental value of thematic content
in identifying intentional misreporting, relative to the predictive value of
quantitative financial and textual style characteristics. Although research
has yet to examine the detection power of disclosure topics, several argu-
ments in the literature suggest that the thematic content of financial state-
ment filings is likely to capture an aspect of managerial deception that is
distinct from what can be gleaned from firms’ financial characteristics or
the textual style of the filings.
Regulatory oversight is more difficult for financial statement narratives,
especially at the topic level, thus leaving more room for managers to use dis-
closure content to obfuscate or mislead. Although researchers have identi-
fied a set of deceptive words and language cues from disclosure narratives
(Newman et al. [2003], Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012]), it is more diffi-
cult for regulators to identify and monitor a set of deceptive topics naı¨vely,
as these topics may be benign or informative about true financial perfor-
mance in other settings or at other times. Furthermore, deceptive managers
have discretion to vary not only the topics discussed in financial statement
filings but also the amount of attention devoted to each. Thus, as argued by
Hoberg and Lewis [2017], the flexible nature of disclosure content allows
for a broader set of dimensions along which financial statement narratives
can be used to identify intentional misreporting.
Research finds that a sizable proportion of the textual narratives in earn-
ings releases and annual report filings contain forward-looking statements
that cover a wide range of topics (Li [2010a], Bozanic, Roulstone, and Van
Buskirk [2018]). This is in marked contrast to quantitative financial infor-
mation, which is primarily backward looking. Evidence also suggests that
management’s discussion of forward-looking information responds differ-
ently to firm conditions, such as poor earnings performance and financial
distress, compared to discussions of backward-looking information (Bon-
sall, Bozanic, and Merkley [2014]). As such, it appears reasonable to expect
that financial statement topics will respond differently to managerial decep-
tion and obfuscation, relative to backward-looking quantitative metrics.
The detection value of disclosure topics beyond textual style is yet an-
other important query, as linguistics research suggests that it is difficult to
discern deception or obfuscation from the textual features of disclosure
6 Consistent with this argument, Amel-Zadeh and Faasse [2016] find that the tone of foot-
note disclosures is more negative than that of the MD&A section, especially when firm perfor-
mance is poor. This result likely reflects managers’ attempt to downplay negative information
by putting a more positive spin on MD&A content. A similar shifting strategy might be at
play in our setting as extended analyses show that MD&A topics have lower detection power,
compared to topics identified from the entire 10-K filing.
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narratives. In fact, this research shows that communication features, such
as tone and abstract language, can be flavored by individuals’ expectations
and motivations, even when the intent is to communicate objectively and
truthfully (Douglas and Sutton [2003]). Accounting researchers also de-
bate whether textual features, such as length, readability, and word usage,
reflect managerial deception or obfuscation or simply the inherent com-
plexity of discussing unusual performance or business events (Bloomfield
[2008], Loughran and McDonald [2016]). Indeed, evidence suggests that
textual complexity is an ambiguous indicator of managerial obfuscation
that often reflects informative technical disclosures or complex accounting
and regulatory standards (Guay, Samuels, and Taylor [2016], Dyer, Lang,
and Stice-Lawrence [2017], Bushee, Gow, and Taylor [2018]).7
Overall, the above arguments suggest that annual report topics may im-
prove the detection of financial misreporting, beyond what can be achieved
using quantitative financial metrics and aggregate measures of textual style
features. However, any incremental detection power is an empirical ques-
tion, given the variety of ways that deception and obfuscation can mani-
fest in written communications. In addition, financial statement filings are
joint outputs of management and legal counsel, leading to content that is
vague and boilerplate in some areas (Brown and Tucker [2011], Hoberg
and Lewis [2017]). This conservative aspect of financial reporting further
implies need for an agnostic set of research questions, as follows.
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Do disclosure topics improve the detection of
intentional financial misreporting, relative to
quantitative financial measures?
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Do disclosure topics improve the detection of
intentional financial misreporting, relative to
aggregate textual style features?
3. Data and Empirical Measures
3.1 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
We base our topic analysis on the textual narratives contained in annual
10-K filings. We focus on 10-K filings, as opposed to other firm disclosures,
because they (1) provide comprehensive coverage of the firm and its activi-
ties throughout the fiscal year, (2) avoid selection biases given their manda-
tory status, and (3) maximize the number of firm-year observations in our
prediction tests. We download the full text of all 10-Ks available through
the SEC EDGAR FTP site from January 1, 1994 (the first year of available
7 Similar arguments can be made for the topics communicated in firm disclosures because
thematic content can reflect business events or regulatory standards as opposed to manage-
rial obfuscation. Nonetheless, in contrast to summary textual measures, the detailed nature of
topic analysis allows for greater insight into how disclosure content and the attention manage-
ment devoted to each topic vary with misreporting.
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data), until December 31, 2012. The download yields 131,528 10-Ks filed
by U.S. firms over the period. We use the full set of filings to generate the
disclosure topics, as this improves the algorithm’s convergence.
We parse the 10-K filings using the approach of Li [2008], but expand
the methodology to remove all items in the filings other than raw text. We
describe our parsing methodology in appendix A.1 of the online appendix.
After generating our topic and textual style measures, we merge the sample
of 10-K filings with Compustat and CRSP, from which we gather financial-
statement and stock-market data, respectively. We exclude financial firms
(Standard Industrial Classifications [SIC] codes 6000-6799) and those firm-
years withmissing Compustat and CRSP data. We gather data on intentional
misreporting from three separate data sources as discussed below and then
merge the 10-K filing sample with each data source.
3.1.1. Identifying Intentional Financial Misreporting. We use three data
sources to identify instances of intentional financial misreporting.8 Our
first data source relies on SEC AAERs to identify misreporting firms and
the affected filings. The AAER data were originally compiled by Dechow
et al. [2011], and were most recently updated by the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley’s CFRM. The updated data set includes all AAERs issued
by the SEC on or before September 30, 2016, and covers accounting and
auditing violations that affect filings issued prior to and including the 2012
calendar year. We create an indicator variable (misreport) that equals 1 for
each annual reporting period affected by an accounting or auditing viola-
tion as identified in the enforcement release and zero otherwise.9 We then
use the misreport variable to classify the corresponding 10-K filing as misre-
ported. From the AAER sample, we identify 505 misreported 10-K filings for
192 unique firms issued from 1994 to 2010. The AAER data do not provide
sufficient violation events that map to our sample in 2011 and 2012.
We draw our next set of misreporting events from the AA Non-Reliance
Restatements database, which covers restatements announced or disclosed
from January 1, 2001, onward. These restatements map to misreported
10-K filings issued during the latter part of our sample period (2000
through 2012). Unlike the AAER data set, the AA data provide a mix of
8 Alternative sources include (1) the Government Accountability Office (GAO) restatement
database, (2) restatement data collected by HLM from Form 8-K filings, and (3) data on SEC
and DOJ enforcement actions for Rule 13(b) violations as used in KKLM and provided by
Call et al. [2018]. We cannot incorporate these data sets into our analyses, as they do not
identify the fiscal period in which the misreporting occurred, or the filing that was affected.
Nonetheless, our samples overlap with these alternative sources, because they rely on similar
underlying data. Research also shows that our data sources have fewer limitations regarding
sample coverage and identification of the misreporting period (see KKLM for comparisons of
the AAER, AA, GAO, and 13(b) data sets).
9 Consistent with Dechow et al. [2011], we exclude enforcement actions for misconduct
that is unrelated to accounting or auditing (e.g., bribery or disclosure-related violations). We
also exclude enforcement actions that do not identify a specific reporting period in which the
violation occurred.
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restatements arising from both unintentional errors and intentional viola-
tions. Given our focus on intentional misreporting, we use the categoriza-
tion process outlined by KKLM to cull the data of unintentional errors. This
process is based on the HLM classification scheme and uses three criteria
to identify intentional misreporting, referred to as irregularities: (1) the
use of the words “fraud” or “irregularity” (or their variants) in reference to
the restatement, (2) whether the restatement is associated with an SEC or
DOJ investigation, and (3) the presence of an independent investigation in
relation to the restatement.
Based on the above criteria, KKLM rely on four variables in the
AA database to distinguish irregularities from errors. We follow the
same approach and classify a restatement as an irregularity if the re-
statement disclosure references financial fraud, irregularities, or misrep-
resentations (AA variable res fraud = 1), or indicates the involvement
of the SEC, P, or other regulator in the restatement process (res sec
investigation = 1).10 We also treat a restatement as an irregularity if the
misstatement is neither a simple misapplication of a GAAP or FASB ac-
counting rule (res accounting = 0) nor an accounting or clerical error
(res clerical errors = 0). For each irregularity, we identify the 10-K filing con-
taining the misstatement and code misreport as 1. This process yields 527
misreported filings issued by 245 unique firms from 2000 through 2012.11
Our final misreporting sample is based on a customized automated
search of amended 10-K filings for material misrepresentations or disclo-
sure omissions that are seemingly intentional. Filing amendments provide
clear advantages in identifying misreporting, compared to conventional re-
statement samples. Amended 10-Ks are routinely filed over our entire sam-
ple period (1994–2012) and thus provide a longer history of irregularities,
relative to the AA restatement sample.12 They also capture financial report-
ing and internal control problems that affect not only the financial state-
ments but also the footnote disclosures, the auditor’s report, and manage-
ment’s report on internal controls over financial reporting.
We download all 10-K/A filings from the SEC EDGAR FTP site and gather
firm-identifying information for matching purposes from the header (or
alternately from the body of the text when the header is missing or
10 The AA data set offers a broader scope of SEC involvement than outlined in the second
HLM criterion. Specifically, the AA taxonomy includes restatements involving an SEC com-
ment letter and those arising from a PCAOB investigation or an investigation by another reg-
ulator.
11 Seventy-three percent of our AA irregularities are nonreliance (“Big R”) restatements
that require the reissuance of the financial statements. Thus, our classification scheme maps
strongly with accounting corrections that are deemed material by management.
12 The AA data also rely on 10-K/As as a source of identifying financial restatements. We
cross check the two samples over the 2000–2012 overlapping period and find that 35% of the
misreported filings identified from 10-K/As map to a restated filing in the full AA database.
This rate of overlap is reasonable, given that AA only archives amendments that correct line
items reported on the face of the financial statements.
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incomplete). We then parse the 10-K/As, using the same method applied
to the original 10-K filings. Next, we apply an automated text search pro-
cedure (see appendix A), based on the HLM classification criteria and a
list of keywords recommended by AA (2012), to identify irregularities from
disclosure narratives. We code misreport as 1 for each 10-K that our search
string identifies as containing an irregularity in the corresponding 10-K/A.
We set misreport to 0 if there is no amended 10-K for the respective filing
year or if the 10-K/A filing does not reveal an irregularity. This process
yields 697 misreported filings across 553 unique firms from 1994 through
2012.
A manual inspection of 50 randomly selected observations indicates that
our customized search tool performs well in capturing material filing revi-
sions that fit the HLM criteria.13 We hand check another random sample
of 20 10-K/As that were not flagged as an irregularity by our search string.
We find that only 1 of the 20 observations reflects an irregularity, indicating
that false negatives are not a major concern. We check a final random sam-
ple of 20 10-K/As flagged as irregularities and find that 76% of the cases
coincide with auditor resignations or dismissals, internal control failures,
late filings, SEC comment letters, and CFO resignations in the current or
subsequent reporting year.14 Thus, amended 10-K filings seem to provide
strong signals of financial reporting and compliance problems.
Table 1 reports the frequency of financial misreporting by calendar year
for all three data sources, along with the overall percentage of firm-years
with detected misreporting events. Panel A presents the frequencies for
the AAER sample, while panels B and C present the frequencies for the AA
and 10-K/A samples, respectively. For each panel, we report the percentage
of misreporting events across all sample years and for the years included in
our out-of-sample prediction tests. The prediction years appear below the
horizontal line in each panel. Consistent with prior research (Larcker and
Zakolyukina [2012], Perols et al. [2017], Bao et al. [2020]), the rate of
misreporting is very low, ranging from 1.34% to 1.65% across all years in
the three samples and from 1.18% to 1.89% across the prediction years.
The rate of misreporting in the AAER sample declines substantially after
2005. This evidence is consistent with Bao et al. [2020], who document that
the AAER sample is more stable prior to 2005, due to the long time lag in
SEC investigations and possible changes in the SEC’s enforcement priori-
ties after the 2008 financial crisis. We observe a similar post-2005 decline
13We randomly draw 50 of the amended 10-Ks that are flagged as disclosing an irregular-
ity by our search tool. Of the 50 observations, 44 (88%) capture material revisions that fit
the HLM criteria. These cases include (1) restatements resulting from internal investigations,
reaudits, or SEC comment letters; (2) revisions to footnote disclosures to correct errors re-
lated to revenue recognition and core expense accounts; and (3) material omissions from
the MD&A and risk factor disclosures. The remaining six observations pertain to cases where
the 10-K/A filing insufficiently explains the revision. We conduct a further screen to remove
amendments that are viewed as more technical. (See appendix A.6.2 of the online appendix.)
14We use the Accounting Quality + Risk Matrix in AA to identify these events.
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in the AA sample. This decline has been attributed to improvements in in-
ternal control assessments and financial reporting quality after the passage
of the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), combined with stronger oversight
of firm disclosures in the SEC’s filing review process (Choudhary, Merkley,
and Schipper [2019]).
3.2 EMPIRICAL MEASURES
3.2.1. Financial and Textual Style Measures. We draw our quantitative fi-
nancial statement and stock market variables from the Dechow et al. [2011]
F-score model (see model 3 in table 9 of their paper). These variables
capture accrual quality, firm performance, off-balance-sheet activities, and
market pressures. We augment the F-score model with variables capturing
firm size, audit quality, and involvement in complex business transactions,
namely, M&As and restructurings. These additional variables capture char-
acteristics that are correlated with reporting risks and the quality of firms’
external and internal monitoring mechanisms (Farber [2005], Doyle, Ge,
and McVay [2007], Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. [2008]). Panel A of appendix B
defines all of our financial variables.
We compute a comprehensive set of textual features (denoted Style) as
described in panel B of appendix B. These measures include common
proxies for readability, textual complexity, and disclosure tone (Li [2008],
Loughran and McDonald [2011]). We also capture deeper linguistic mark-
ers, such as language voice, lexical variety, and disclosure emphasis (Goel
et al. [2010], Goel and Gangolly [2012]), Rennekamp [2012], Purda and
Skillicorn [2015]). Finally, we construct four additional measures derived
from our parsing process: (1) the log of the number of bullets, (2) the
length of the SEC mandated header, (3) the number of excess newlines
(vertical white space), and (4) the character length of HTML tags. These
measures are exploratory and attempt to control for unobservable factors.
3.2.2. LDA Topic Measure. Our measure of thematic content (topic) is
based on the unstructured and unsupervised LDA topic modeling method-
ology developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan [2003]. We choose this ap-
proach due to its intuitive characteristics and strong performance. LDA
is a Bayesian probabilistic model and offers significant improvements over
older data-driven and principle-component–based tools, such as Latent Se-
mantic Analysis (LSA). Further, the topic modeling accuracy of LDA is quite
strong, when compared to human topic classification. For example, Anaya
[2011] finds that humans classify topics with 94% accuracy, whereas LDA
achieves 84% accuracy. Likewise, using human judges, Chang et al. [2009]
find that LDA produces semantically meaningful and coherent topics that
correspond well to human concepts.
In the context of business narratives, Eickhoff and Neuss [2017] re-
port that LDA and other topic models have been successfully applied to
textual documents in several disciplines, including accounting, finance,
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information systems, and management.15 Many of these studies use qualita-
tive or quantitative methods (or both) to evaluate the effectiveness of LDA
in identifying business-related topics. Qualitatively, Bellstam et al. [2019]
find that LDA generates topics from analyst reports that conform well to
concepts used to describe innovation activities. Quantitative analyses fur-
ther confirm that these topics are strongly correlated with innovation mea-
sures. Huang et al. [2018] use a human coder to classify the topics dis-
cussed in the conference call transcripts and analyst reports for three firms
in the same industry. They find that the LDA topic assignments match
the topics identified by the human coder about two-thirds of the time.
Using qualitative techniques, such as topic labeling and visual analysis of
economic trends, Huang et al. [2018] also find that LDA reliably captures
the economic content of analyst reports and conference calls. Lastly, Dyer,
Lang, and Stice-Lawrence [2017] employ the human validation technique
of Chang et al. [2009] and find that LDA topics derived from 10-K narra-
tives are coherent and meaningful when tested against human intuition.
Collectively, this body of evidence indicates that LDA is effective at classify-
ing the thematic content of business-related narratives.
The LDA model is based on a few simple assumptions. It assumes a col-
lection of K topics in a given document and that the vocabulary of each
topic is distributed following a Dirichlet distribution, βK ∼ Dirichlet(η).
The model further assumes that the topic proportions in each document
d are drawn from a Dirichlet distribution θd ∼ Dirichlet(α). Given these
assumptions, a specific number of topics to identify, and a few learning pa-
rameters, the LDA model categorizes the words in a given set of documents
into well-defined topics. Because the model uses Bayesian analysis, a word
is allowed to be associated with multiple topics. This is a distinguishing fea-
ture of LDA, as words can have multiple meanings, especially in different
contexts. In short, LDA is a probabilistic process that condenses the vocab-
ulary in a collection of documents into a dictionary of topics and a set of
topic weights.
We implement LDA using a dynamic time-series process, because annual
report content is likely to vary over time, due to macroeconomic or industry
trends, changes in disclosure requirements, or managerial turnover (Dyer,
Lang, and Stice-Lawrence [2017]). This approach allows us to assess the
changing nature of disclosure content and its ability to predict misreport-
ing over time. Our time-series procedure identifies the topics discussed in
14 rolling five-year windows over our sample period (1994 through 2012).
That is, we run the algorithm for the periods 1994–1998, 1995–1999, 1996–
2000, and so on. The topics discovered in each five-year window are then
used to determine the disclosure content of annual reports issued in the
15One of the first studies to apply topic modeling to business documents is by Boukus and
Rosenberg [2006], who use LSA to analyze the content of the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee’s (FOMC) meeting minutes.
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FIG. 1.—Time-series research design. This figure illustrates the setup of our rolling time-series
estimation and prediction procedures. Panel A depicts the general structure of our rolling
five-year estimation periods and the prediction years immediately following each window.
Panel B depicts our treatment of misreporting events within each window for the samples
of irregularities drawn from Audit Analytics (AA) and amended 10-K filings (10-K/As). Mis-
reporting events are included in the in-sample estimation window only if the event is publicly
revealed by the end of the five-year window. Misreporting events that are revealed outside of
the five-year period are excluded from the in-sample estimation period. As illustrated in panel
B, the first misreporting event (green X) is included in both estimation periods (1994–1998
and 1995–1999), whereas the second misreporting event (red X) is excluded. The process
described above does not apply to the AAER sample because the enforcement release dates
are not available in the CFRM database. Thus, all misreporting events in the AAER sample are
presumed to be publicly known by the end of each estimation window.
year immediately following each window. This results in a test period of
1999–2012 for our prediction analyses. (This period is reduced to 1999–
2010 for the AAER sample and to 2005–2012 for the AA sample.) Panel A
of figure 1 illustrates the setup of our rolling window analysis. Note that,
although new topics may arise in the year after each window, the topics dis-
cussed in the prior five years provide themost practical estimates of current-
year disclosure content while avoiding potential look-ahead biases.
We follow Hoffman, Bach, and Blei [2010] and implement LDA using
an online batch variant of the algorithm. This approach is computationally
efficient as the algorithm is applied to small batches at a time (100 filings).
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We draw the filings in each batch in random order to mitigate overweight-
ing of early years in the online LDA tool. We then set the algorithm to
identify 31 topics in each five-year window. We select 31 topics because sim-
ulated results indicate that this number of topics is optimal in detecting ir-
regularities drawn from amended 10-K filings.16 We run the LDA algorithm
on the filings, generating 31 topics in each window and the weighting for
each word associated with the topic. We use these word weights to compute
the weighting of each topic in filings issued in the year after the window
(e.g., the word weights for topics identified in the 1994 to 1998 window
are applied to filings issued in 1999). The topic weights in a given filing
are computed by multiplying the vector of word weights for each topic by
a vector of word counts from the filing. We normalize the topic weights by
scaling by the sum of the weights of all topics identified in the filing. This
procedure generates the proportion of the annual report narrative (rang-
ing from 0 to 1) that is devoted to each topic. We further orthogonalize the
topic proportions to 2-digit SIC to adjust for unobserved industry effects.17
We denote the industry-normalized topic proportions as topic.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 EVALUATION OF LDA TOPIC MEASURE
We assess the validity of the LDA topics before tackling our research
questions. Because LDA is unsupervised, it is necessary to evaluate the algo-
rithm’s effectiveness in capturing human intuitions. We follow prior studies
and use both human and machine-based evaluation methods to assess the
semantic meaning and interpretability of the topics inferred from the 10-K
narratives (Chang et al. [2009], Quinn et al. [2010], Bao and Datta [2014],
Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence [2017], Huang et al. [2018], Bellstam et al.
[2019]).18
16We run the simulation on our 10-K/A sample, given the lack of misreporting events for
multiple years in the AAER and AA samples. The details of our simulations are in appendix
A.2 of the online appendix.
17 Our results are unchanged when we also orthogonalize the topic measure to audit firm
type (Big N, midsize, or small firm) to control for unobserved audit firm effects.
18 An alternative approach is the use of human coders to classify topics discussed in a subset
of our 10-K narratives. The topics identified by the human coders would then serve as a bench-
mark for evaluating the LDA topic assignments. We refrain from using this approach, given
the time-consuming and rigid nature of manual coding (Quinn et al. [2010]). Tomake human
classification tasks feasible, studies typically present coders with a fixed list of potential topic
labels prior to commencing the task. The coders would then read units of text and attempt to
assign one of the topics from the fixed list to each unit. This directed form of human coding is
used in both Anaya [2011] and Huang et al. [2018] as a benchmarking method. (See section
3.2.2 for earlier discussion of these studies.) Although ex ante knowledge of potential topics is
a reasonable design choice, one drawback is that this approach is likely to bias or limit human
judgments, thereby reducing the usefulness of human classification as a validation method.
We therefore focus on evaluating whether our LDA topics have human-identifiable semantic
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4.1.1. Interpretation and Labeling of LDA Topic Output. Our first method
evaluates the semantic meaning of the LDA output by labeling the topics
and assessing the extent to which they provide meaningful economic con-
tent. This form of evaluation is qualitative and follows from several studies,
including those by Quinn et al. [2010], Bao and Datta [2014], Bellstam
et al. [2019], Hoberg and Lewis [2017], and Huang et al. [2018]. However,
one limitation of this approach is that it naturally involves human discre-
tion, given the manual process of topic labeling. This limitation, nonethe-
less, is not a concern for our empirical analyses, as our prediction tests are
based on the quantitative topic proportions within each filing and not the
assigned labels.
As discussed above, we derive our topic measure using a time-series ap-
proach, with 31 topics identified in each of the 14 rolling five-year windows
over our sample period. For ease of interpretation and labeling, we aggre-
gate the topics discovered in each window up to the full sample. We refer to
the aggregate topics as “combined topics.” We allow multiple topics within
a given window to be associated with the same combined topic. We also al-
low the number of combined topics to exceed 31, as some topics do not
appear in every window. We derive the combined topics by matching topics
across years based on the Pearson correlation of the word weights within
the topics. All topics with a Pearson correlation above a specific threshold
are grouped together. We test correlation thresholds from 1% to 90% in
1% intervals to determine the most coherent grouping. The most coherent
grouping is achieved at the 11% threshold, resulting in 64 combined topics
across our sample period.
To determine the underlying content of each combined topic, we gener-
ate a list of the highest weighted phrases and sentences associated with each
topic. (See Hoberg and Lewis [2017] and Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence
[2017] for a similar approach.) We construct the list by first extracting the
top 1,000 sentences per topic based on the weighted words associated with
each combined topic. Next, we sort the sentences based on length and
extract the middle tercile (334 sentences) as representative sentences of
typical length. The 20 most frequent bigrams (two-word phrases exclud-
ing stop words, numbers, and symbols) are then extracted from the 334
midlength sentences. These sentences are also sorted based on the cosine
similarity between a given sentence and the remaining 333 sentences. We
manually review the top 20 bigrams and top 100 midlength sentences based
on cosine similarity, and assign descriptive labels to each of the combined
topics.
Appendix A.3 of the online appendix lists the inferred topic labels for
the 64 combined topics.19 We note that the LDA algorithm performs well
coherence. This approach is superior, in that it does not require devising a list of benchmark
topics or providing our LDA topic labels to human judges beforehand.
19 The topic labels for the first 50 topics are also available in figures 2–4. Appendix A.3
also presents 10 representative bigrams and two representative midlength sentences for
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in identifying narrative content that relates distinctively to changes in firms’
financial performance and their financing activities. For instance, com-
bined topics 1 and 2 both refer to income performance, compared to
prior periods. Examples of top midlength sentences from both topics are
“The company’s gross profit margin decreased to 59% in Fiscal 1996, com-
pared to 65% in Fiscal 1995” and “Operating profit was $122.8 million in
2011, compared with $113.9 million in 2010, an increase of 7.8%.” Other
performance- and financing-related topics include segment performance
(combined topics 12 and 40), debt issuances and credit arrangements (19,
33, and 45), and equity transactions (39). LDA also identifies topics related
to complex business transactions such as hedging activities (8 and 29) and
M&As and spin-offs (11, 22, 30, and 38).
Several topics refer to specific financial statement items and their
underlying measurement or recognition assumptions. These include
accounts receivable and doubtful accounts (10), long-term assets (16),
revenue recognition (17), advertising expenses (25), and postretirement
cost assumptions (3). Consistent with Bao and Datta [2014], we find that
LDA discovers content related to business risks and contingencies, such as
foreign currency risks (43), country risks (13 and 26), and litigation (31).20
Lastly, the algorithm identifies several industry-specific topics (50–64),
though we do not discuss them for brevity’s sake.
4.1.2. Word Intrusion Tasks. Our next evaluation method uses “word in-
trusion” tasks to assess the semantic coherence of the unaggregated topics
derived by the algorithm across each of the rolling windows. Chang et al.
[2009] argue that the overall interpretability of LDA-derived topics can be
evaluated by the extent to which human subjects agree with the makeup of
the topics. Using this logic, they develop a word intrusion task in which hu-
man subjects attempt to identify an unrelated or “intruder” word inserted
into a list of words that LDA selects as belonging to the same topic. If the
set of words from the LDA model is coherent, then the human subjects
should easily identify the intruder word at a rate that is significantly higher
than random chance. Thus, a higher identification rate indicates higher
interpretability of the LDA output.
We conduct our word intrusion tasks using both human-subject as well
as machine-based procedures. Given the many topics across our rolling
each topic. The reported bigrams exclude redundant phrases and those with similar infer-
ences. Note also that the inferred labels for a few topics are overlapping, due to only minor
differences in the content inferred from the bigrams and midlength sentences. This overlap
does not affect our empirical tests, as we estimate our prediction models using the individual
LDA topics and not the combined topics.
20We follow Bao and Datta [2014] and assess whether our LDA topics are correlated with
investors’ risk perceptions as proxied by future stock return volatility. Consistent with their ev-
idence, we find that 10-K discussions of macro-level risk factors, namely, foreign currency and
country risks, environmental risks, and commodity risks, are positively associated with future
return volatility. We also find that discussions of derivative and hedging activities, securitiza-
tions, and business collaborations influence risk perceptions.
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windows, we are limited in using human subjects to test the coherence of
all the topics inferred by LDA. Our machine-based procedures mitigate this
limitation by allowing us to test the coherence of the entire set of topics. We
briefly discuss the setup of the task procedures and our results and provide
more detailed descriptions in appendix A.4 of the online appendix.
We take all of the unaggregated topics discovered within each rolling win-
dow and randomly select 3 of the 10 most probable words associated with
each topic based on the word weights from the LDA model. An intruder
word is then selected at random from a pool of the top 10 words appear-
ing in another random topic. We next apply a word embedding algorithm
to test all possible word combinations across all the topics (i.e., three topic
words plus a random intruder word). Our human-subjects procedure fol-
lows from Chang et al. [2009] and is conducted using a short experimental
task with 180 online workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We
make the MTurk task practicable by asking participants to identify the in-
truder word from a small subset (20) of the word combinations evaluated
by the machine algorithm. The results from both procedures indicate iden-
tification rates that are statistically higher than random chance (25% or
one out of four words) at the 1% level. The machine-based procedure cor-
rectly identifies the intruder word with accuracy rates ranging from 50%
to 53%, while the human-subjects task produces an average accuracy rate
of 40%.
Taken together, our qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods sug-
gest that the LDA algorithm provides a valid set of semantically meaningful
topics that are reasonably coherent and interpretable by human judges.
4.2 PREDICTIVE VALUE OF LDA TOPIC MEASURE
4.2.1. Empirical Methodology. We investigate our research questions by es-
timating in-sample prediction models over rolling five-year windows. (See
panel A of figure 1.) We then conduct out-of-sample tests using the regres-
sion estimates from each five-year window to predict the likelihood of in-
tentional misreporting in the year after the end of each window.
For filings coded as misreported in the AA and 10-K/A irregularity sam-
ples, we ensure that the misreporting event is revealed by the end of the
in-sample window. That is, the in-sample prediction model for a given five-
year window incorporates a misreporting event only if the event is publicly
known by the end of the window. Misreporting events that are revealed
outside of the five-year window are excluded from the in-sample model
(misreport is recoded as zero for the respective filing in that particular win-
dow). This research design choice mitigates look-ahead biases and pro-
duces predictions that are real time in nature, as our in-sample models
mimic the set of information that is publicly available as of the end of each
window. This setup is analogous to a regulator or corporate monitor that
estimates the likelihood of misreporting at the end of each calendar year
using known instances of misreporting over the prior five years plus the
disclosure content of annual filings issued over that same five-year period.
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The regulator or monitor then uses these estimates to detect misreporting
in filings issued in the subsequent year. Panel B of figure 1 illustrates the
setup of our prediction analysis for the AA and 10-K/A samples.21 We can-
not apply this setup to the AAER sample, as the CFRM data set does not
include the release dates of the AAERs. Thus, the analysis for the AAER
sample implicitly assumes that all of the AAER events are publicly known
by the end of each estimation window.
Our first prediction model regresses misreport on vectors of the disaggre-
gated topic proportions (topic) as follows:
log
(
misreporti,t
1 − misreporti,t
)
= α +
31∑
j=1
β j topic j,i,t
+ εi,t , t ∈ [T − 5,T − 1], i ∈ Firms. (1)
We estimate equation (1) for the five-year window preceding each of the
out-of-sample prediction years in each of the three misreporting samples.
As noted previously, our out-of-sample prediction tests cover 1999 to 2010
for the AAER sample and 2005 to 2012 for the AA irregularity sample. We
can estimate out-of-sample predictions for all years, 1999 to 2012, in the
10-K/A irregularity sample. Similar to Dechow et al. [2011], we construct a
prediction score (p misreport) using the estimated coefficients from equa-
tion (1) and apply this scoring in our out-of-sample tests as follows:
log
(
misreporti,T
1 − misreporti,T
)
= α + β1p misreporti,T + εi,T , i ∈ Firms. (2)
We estimate two additional regression specifications to examine RQ1.
The first specification replaces the topic vector with a vector of quantita-
tive financial measures (denoted F-score). The second specification extends
equation (1) by including the topic and F-score vectors as a joint set of pre-
dictors.22 We generate p misreport for both specifications and run the out-
of-sample tests. For RQ2, we introduce two additional specifications that in-
clude a vector of our textual style measures (denoted Style). The first model
is a standalone regression of our textual style metrics, whereas the second
model incorporates both topic and Style. We also introduce a comprehensive
21 As depicted in panel B of figure 1, assume that a firm misstated revenues in 1997. The
misstatement was later announced in an amended 10-K filing in 2000 (as captured by our text
search tool). Because the misstatement was not revealed until 2000, we exclude the misreport-
ing event from each of the five-year estimation windows ending in 1998 and 1999. The mis-
reporting event would be incorporated only in the 1996–2000 and 1997–2001 estimation win-
dows.
22 The restructuring indicator variable is valid only for the 2000 fiscal year and onward, due
to the lack of restructuring data in Compustat for prior years. We thus exclude the restructur-
ing variable from the F-Score vector when estimating the model for the five-year windows that
do not overlap with the 2000 fiscal year.
USING topic TO DETECT FINANCIAL MISREPORTING 261
model that includes all three sets of prediction variables: topic, F-score, and
Style. We benchmark this model against a final model of F-score and Style to
assess the incremental power of topic over the full set of financial metrics
and textual features. The comprehensive model is specified in equation 3:
log
(
misreporti,t
1 − misreporti,t
)
= α +
17∑
j=1
β j F-score j,i,t +
20∑
j=1
β j+17Style j,i,t
+
31∑
j=1
β j+37topic j,i,t + εi,t , t ∈ [T − 5,T − 1],
i ∈ Firms. (3)
We tightly control the convergence of our logistic regressions, given the
large number of predictors and the low frequency of misreporting events
in our test windows. We control the convergence by conducting checks
for both completeness and quasi-completeness of each regression specifi-
cation. Appendix A.5 of the online appendix details the necessary steps for
conducting these checks.
We follow prior research and use the area under the receiver operat-
ing characteristics (ROC) curve to evaluate the out-of-sample classification
performance of each detection model (Hobson, Mayew, and Venkatacha-
lam [2012], Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012], Bao et al. [2020]).23 The
ROC curve is a two-dimensional plot across different cutoff thresholds of
the true positive rate (sensitivity) on the y-axis against the false positive
rate (specificity) on the x-axis. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is
a widely used indicator of a model’s predictive ability, because more accu-
rate models would have ROC plots that are closer to the upper left corner
of the graph (i.e., higher true positive rates with lower false positive rates).
The AUC values can range from 0.50 to 1 and represent the probability
that a randomly chosen positive instance of misreporting will be ranked
higher by the respective model, compared to a randomly chosen negative
instance.
Any reasonable detection model should have an AUC greater than 0.5
(i.e., the model should perform better than a random classificationmodel).
We assess whether the AUCs for our models are greater than 0.50 by com-
paring the AUC for each model against the AUCs produced using simu-
lated random data bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. We also use boot-
strapping to compare classification performance across models. We apply
the method of Janes, Longton, and Pepe [2009] and conduct bootstrapped,
23 In robustness tests, we use Fisher’s (1932) method to generate an aggregate test statistic
that assesses whether one detection model performs better than another when pooled across
years. The inferences from this alternative test statistic are consistent with the conclusions
drawn from the pooled AUC statistics.
262 N. C. BROWN, R. M. CROWLEY, AND W. B. ELLIOTT
nonparametric Wald tests (based on 1,000 bootstrapped replications) of
the differences in the AUCs between the prediction models. Given our
rolling time-series analyses, we compute the AUCs and Wald test p-values
using pooled data for all prediction years with bootstrapped standard er-
rors corrected for clustering by year.
4.2.2. In-Sample Predictive Value of topic. We first evaluate the in-sample
performance of topic in detecting misreporting. For each sample, we esti-
mate annual in-sample regressions of equation (1) using the unaggregated,
industry-normalized topic proportions. For ease of interpretation, figures
2–4 present visual illustrations of the results based on the combined topics
listed in appendix A.3 of the online appendix. We exclude the industry-
specific topics from the figures for brevity. Figure 2 presents results for the
AAER sample; figures 3 and 4 present results for the AA and 10-K/A sam-
ples, respectively.
Each figure depicts the presence of each combined topic across the sam-
ple’s prediction years and whether the combined topic is significantly asso-
ciated with the misreporting events identified by the respective sample. We
report the significance of the combined topics, based on the z-statistics for
the coefficient estimates on the underlying unaggregated subtopics (i.e.,
the individual topics associated with a given combined topic in each year).
For each prediction year, we present green (red) boxes if at least one
subtopic for a given combined topic loads as positive (negative) and signif-
icant at the 10% level or greater, and all other subtopics are insignificant.
We code the boxes as gray (“Other”) if all subtopics for a given combined
topic are insignificant, if multiple subtopics are significant but with oppos-
ing signs, or if all subtopics are dropped from the regression due to multi-
collinearity.
We observe in all three figures that the discussion of several topics is rel-
atively consistent across the sample years. These topics include changes in
income performance (topics 1 and 2), measurement of postretirement ben-
efits (3), cost commitments (4), and real estate loan operations (9). Other
topics appear later in the sample period, indicating the evolving nature
of management communications. For instance, discussions of collaborative
business arrangements (27, 32, and 37) are prominent in the second half
of our prediction period. Likewise, discussions of securitized securities (41)
emerge solely in 2008, coinciding with the turmoil in asset-backed securities
markets leading up to the financial crisis.
With respect to detection power, we observe in figure 2 (AAER sample)
that discussions of increases in income performance, compared to prior
periods (combined topic 2), unambiguously predict accounting violations
in all but two of the prediction years. Although the direction of the pre-
diction varies throughout the period, we note that discussions of income
increases are positively associated with misreporting in 6 out of the 10 years
with significant loadings. In the same vein, we find that discussions of seg-
ment performance (topic 40) are positively associated with misreporting
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FIG. 2.—Combined topic distribution and AAER prediction. This chart depicts the presence
of each combined topic across the prediction years and whether the combined topic is sig-
nificantly associated with financial misreporting involving SEC enforcement actions (AAERs).
We do not report the industry-specific topics (topic 50–64) for brevity. The square boxes are
color coded based on the direction and statistical significance of the underlying unaggregated
subtopics from yearly in-sample logit regressions. The unaggregated subtopics are those topics
that are associated with a given combined topic in each year. We orthogonalize all subtopics
to two-digit SIC to control for unobserved industry effects. The square boxes are color coded
green (red) if the subtopics positively (negatively) predict misreporting involving AAERs. The
box is color coded grey if the subtopics are statistically significant with ambiguous direction
(i.e., multiple subtopics load in opposing directions), insignificant in the respective year, or
dropped from the prediction model due to collinearity.
in at least one prediction year. These results could reflect the upward ma-
nipulation of performance measures during periods of misreporting and
firms’ tendency to grandstand the manipulated performance itself in their
disclosures (Dechow et al. [2011], Hoberg and Lewis [2017]). We also ob-
serve that discussions of declines in income performance (topic 1) are less
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FIG. 3.—Combined topic distribution and AA irregularity prediction. This chart depicts the
presence of each combined topic across the prediction period and whether the combined
topic is significantly associated with financial misreporting based on the Audit Analytics (AA)
irregularity sample. We do not report the industry-specific topics (topic 50–64) for brevity.
The square boxes are color coded based on the direction and statistical significance of the un-
derlying unaggregated subtopics from yearly in-sample logit regressions. The unaggregated
subtopics are those topics that are associated with a given combined topic in each year. We
orthogonalize all subtopics to two-digit SIC to control for unobserved industry effects. The
square boxes are color coded green (red) if the subtopics positively (negatively) predict mis-
reporting in the AA sample. The box is color coded grey if the subtopics are statistically signif-
icant with ambiguous direction (i.e., multiple subtopics load in opposing directions), insignif-
icant in the respective year, or dropped from the prediction model due to collinearity.
predictive of misreporting in the AAER sample. This finding mirrors prior
evidence suggesting that the association between misreporting and poor
financial performance is not as clear-cut as posited in the literature (De-
chow et al. [2011]).
Other noteworthy results from figure 2 indicate that discussions re-
lated to M&As, share transactions, and certain business arrangements
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FIG. 4.—Combined topic distribution and 10-K/A irregularity prediction. This chart depicts
the presence of each combined topic across the prediction period and whether the combined
topic is significantly associated with financial misreporting based on the sample of irregular-
ities identified from amended 10-K filings (10-K/As). We do not report the industry-specific
topics (50–64) for brevity. The square boxes are color coded based on the direction and statis-
tical significance of the underlying disaggregated subtopics from yearly in-sample logit regres-
sions. The disaggregated subtopics are those topics that are associated with a given combined
topic in each year. We orthogonalize all subtopics to two-digit SIC to control for unobserved in-
dustry effects. The square boxes are color coded green (red) if the subtopics positively (nega-
tively) predict misreporting in the 10-K/A sample. The box is color coded grey if the subtopics
are statistically significant with ambiguous direction (i.e., multiple subtopics load in opposing
directions), insignificant in the respective year, or dropped from the prediction model due to
collinearity.
are positively associated with misreporting, whereas discussions sur-
rounding cost commitments, credit agreements, and environmental risks
are negatively associated with misreporting. Similar to the findings of
Hoberg and Lewis [2017], these results suggest that misreporting firms
overdiscuss activities that create incentives to misreport but underdiscuss
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issues related to financial agreements and risk factors. We also find that
discussions of postretirement benefit assumptions are negatively associated
with misreporting in several years. Consistent with Dechow et al. [2011],
this result could reflect management’s discretionary use of employee ben-
efit assumptions to adjust reported expenses and their tendency to under-
discuss these assumptions in misreporting years.
The evidence from our irregularity samples resembles that from the
AAER sample but with variations in the timing and direction of the topic
loadings. At first glance, the evidence from the AA irregularity sample
(figure 3) might seem to contrast with the results from the other samples.
But because this sample is confined to the later years of our prediction pe-
riod, closer inspection reveals that these results are fairly consistent with the
post-2005 results in figures 2 and 4. That is, several of the topics that load
as positive in the earlier years of the AAER and 10-K/A samples begin to
load as negative in the latter half. This evidence further demonstrates the
time-varying nature of financial report narratives and how these narratives
capture intentional misreporting.
4.2.3. Predictive Value of topic Versus Financial Variables (RQ1). Table 2
presents separate summary statistics of our financial variables for misre-
ported and non-misreported firm-years in each sample. We provide tests
of differences in the means of each variable (clustered by firm) between
each set of firm-years. We find that only one of the financial variables be-
haves similarly across the three samples. Firms are more likely to issue secu-
rities during periods of misreporting in all three samples. Several variables,
however, show opposing differences across the samples, with many failing
to show significant differences in the AA and 10-K/A irregularity samples.
Although these differential results could reflect the more egregious na-
ture of AAERs or identification issues across misreporting samples (KKLM),
they highlight the difficulty in establishing clear associations between mis-
reporting and standard financial metrics (Dechow et al. [2011], Purda and
Skillicorn [2015]).
Table 3 presents out-of-sample tests of the predictive role of topic
and F-score. We reiterate that these tests are conducted using the un-
aggregated topics (not the combined topics) discovered in each rolling
window. Panels A, C, and E present the pooled AUC statistics for the
AAER, AA, and 10-K/A samples, respectively. The AUCs across the three
panels indicate that quantitative financial metrics (F-score) are signif-
icant predictors of misreporting, especially for events that trigger an
enforcement action. The AUCs for the F-score model range from 0.589
in the 10-K/A sample to a high of 0.708 in the AAER sample. All of
the AUCs for the F-score model are statistically greater than a random
classification model (AUC = 0.500) at the 5% level and higher. The AUCs
for the topic model also exceed the 0.50 threshold in all three samples,
indicating the ability of thematic content to independently detect various
forms of financial misreporting. The predictive value of topic is markedly
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TA B L E 3
Out-of-Sample Prediction Analysis of topic and F-score
Panel A: AUC statistics (AAERs)
Prediction model AUC
F-score 0.708∗∗∗
topic 0.680∗∗∗
topic and F-score 0.742∗∗∗
Panel B: Difference tests (AAERs)
F-score topic and F-score
topic Diff. in AUC −0.028 −0.063∗∗∗
p-value (0.19) (0.00)
topic and F-score Diff. in AUC 0.034∗∗∗
p-value (0.00)
Panel C: AUC statistics (AA irregularities)
Prediction model AUC
F-score 0.597∗∗
topic 0.616∗∗
topic and F-score 0.632∗∗
Panel D: Difference tests (AA irregularities)
F-score topic and F-score
topic Diff. in AUC 0.019 −0.016∗
p-value (0.29) (0.10)
topic and F-score Diff. in AUC 0.035∗∗∗
p-value (0.01)
Panel E: AUC statistics (10-K/A irregularities)
Prediction model AUC
F-score 0.589∗∗∗
topic 0.616∗∗∗
topic and F-score 0.630∗∗∗
Panel F: Difference tests (10-K/A irregularities)
F-score topic and F-score
topic Diff. in AUC 0.027∗∗ −0.014∗
p-value (0.08) (0.08)
topic and F-score Diff. in AUC 0.041∗∗∗
p-value (0.00)
This table reports results from comparative out-of-sample tests of the prediction models based on vectors of topic and
financial metrics (denoted as F-score). The topic vector is comprised of measures capturing the proportion of a firm’s 10-
K filing devoted to discussing a particular theme. Section 3.2.2 describes how the topic measures are derived. The set of
variables in the F-score vector are defined in panel A of appendix B. Panels A, C, and E present statistics of the detection
performance of each model for the AAER sample and the Audit Analytics (AA) and 10-K/A irregularity samples, respectively.
The performance statistics are computed using pooled values of the area under the receiver operating classification curve
(AUC) generated by out-of-sample regressions ofmisreport on p misreport (derived by estimating eachmodel in rolling five-year
windows prior to the prediction year). The statistical significance of each AUC statistic is determined by assessing whether
the statistic is significantly greater than 0.50, which is the AUC for a random classification model. We determine the statistical
significance by comparing the statistic against the AUCs produced using simulated random data bootstrapped and clustered
by year with 1,000 replications. Panels B, D, and F present nonparametric Wald tests of the differences in the AUCs for the
AAER, AA, and 10-K/A samples, respectively. The Wald tests are based on 1,000 bootstrap iterations with clustering by year.
Each panel reports test statistics and p-values (in parentheses) indicating whether the model specification in a given row is
significantly better at predicting misreporting out-of-sample compared to the model specification in the respective column
(two-tailed). The significance levels for all tests are denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗
denotes p < 0.10.
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higher in the AAER sample, with a predictive gain of 18% over a random
model, compared to a 12% gain in the AA and 10-K/A samples (AUC of
0.680 in the AAER sample versus 0.616 for both irregularity samples; statis-
tically different at the 1% and 5% levels). This differential result suggests
that disclosure content varies strongly with instances of misreporting where
there is high confidence of the intent to mislead.
Panels B, D, and F present Wald tests of the predictive ability of topic,
compared to that of F-score and a joint model of both predictors. Panel
B presents the test results for the AAER sample, whereas panels D and F
present results for the AA and 10-K/A samples, respectively. Each panel
compares the model listed in the row with the model listed in the col-
umn. The AUC comparisons for the AAER sample (panel B) reveal that
the standalone topic vector performs equivalent to the F-score vector. Specif-
ically, the pooled AUC for the standalone topic model is not significantly
different from the AUC for the F-score model (Wald p-value = 0.19). Thus,
topic as a standalone predictor rivals the detection ability of quantitative
financial metrics. Nonetheless, we find that a joint model of topic and F-
score performs significantly better at predicting AAERs, compared to the
standalone F-score model. In fact, our topic measure increases predictive
accuracy by 3.4% when added to the F-score model (AUC of 0.742 versus
0.708, Wald p-value = 0.00). The joint topic and F-score model also outper-
forms the standalone topicmodel by 6.2% (AUC of 0.742 versus 0.680, Wald
p-value = 0.00), consistent with our finding that F-score is an equally strong
predictor of AAER events.
The benchmarking results from our irregularity samples continue to
demonstrate the incremental predictive value of disclosure content. In the
AA sample (panel D), we find that topic improves predictive accuracy by
3.5% (AUC of 0.632 versus 0.597, Wald p-value = 0.00) when added to the
standard F-score model. Similar to the AAER sample, we find no difference
in the predictive accuracy of the standalone topic and F-score models for the
AA sample. That is, the disclosure content of annual reports fares just as
well in detecting irregularity restatements, compared to quantitative finan-
cial metrics. Lastly, the 10-K/A results in panel F show that our topicmeasure
boosts predictive accuracy by a magnitude similar to that observed in the
AAER and AA samples (4.1% increase in AUC, Wald p-value = 0.00).
Collectively, the results in table 3 suggest that content-based information
drawn from annual report narratives improves the detection of misreport-
ing beyond what can be achieved by financial metrics. Our evidence also
suggests that disclosure content and financial variables performs equally
well in detecting misreporting, though both predictors serve as comple-
mentary warning signals.
4.2.4. The Predictive Value of topic Versus Textual Style (RQ2). Table 4
presents separate summary statistics for our style characteristics. We find
that many of the style features shift inconsistently in misreporting years
and, at times, contradict conventional views. For instance, misreported
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filings in the AA and 10-K/A samples are more readable, relative to
nonmisreported filings, whereas misreported filings in the AAER sample
are less readable. Such opposing evidence is not unique to our study, as
Purda and Skillicorn [2015] find contradictory evidence of more deceptive
and negative language in filings classified as “truthful.” These findings
underscore the potential pitfalls in relying on basic textual measures to
identify financial misreporting.
Table 5 presents the pooled AUC statistics for out-of-sample tests of the
predictive performance of topic, relative to the performance of the textual
style (Style) vector. Panels A and B present the test statistics for AAERs; pan-
els C–F present the results for the two irregularity samples. The benchmark-
ing tests for the AAER and AA samples indicate that topic by itself better
predicts misreporting than the standalone Style model (3.1% and 3.5% in-
crease in AUC, in panels B and D, respectively; Wald p-values = 0.01 and
0.06). The topicmodel, however, performs worse than the Style specification
in the 10-K/A sample (panel F).
We observe that a joint model of topic and Style outperforms the individ-
ual Style model by almost 6% in the AAER sample (panel B, Wald p-value =
0.00). Both models perform at the same level in the AA and 10-K/A sam-
ples (panels D and F, respectively; Wald p-values = 0.13 and 0.27). Although
the joint topic and Stylemodel dominates in the AAER sample, the basic topic
model achieves an accuracy level in the AA sample that ranks just as high as
the joint model. Thus, the predictive value of topic over Style is quite strong
when detecting misreporting events that trigger an enforcement action or
a financial restatement.
4.2.5. Joint Predictive Value of topic, Financial Variables, and Textual Style.
We next examine the interplay between all three sets of predictors: topic,
F-Score, and Style. This comprehensive analysis evaluates whether the incre-
mental predictive ability of topic is robust to the inclusion of the combined
set of financial and textual style measures. Table 6 presents out-of-sample
results for equation (3). For brevity, we do not present performance mea-
sures for all model combinations of the three sets of predictors. For the
AAER and AA samples, we present performance statistics for the joint topic
and F-scoremodel, because the AUCs for this specification outrank the AUCs
for the joint topic and Stylemodel in these two samples. Likewise, we present
performance statistics for the joint topic and Stylemodel for the 10-K/A sam-
ple, because this model is more dominant in that sample.24
In table 6, we find that the three-vector model performs well in detecting
misreporting out of sample. The AUCs across the three samples are well
24 The AUCs for the joint topic and F-score model are 3.4% and 1.8% higher than the AUCs
for the joint topic and Style model in the AAER and AA samples, respectively. The AUC for
the topic and Style specification is 3.9% higher than that for the topic and F-score model in the
10-K/A sample. We compute these differences by comparing the AUCs reported in tables 3
and 5 across each sample. All the differences are statistically significant at the 5% level and
greater, except for the 1.8% difference quoted for the AA sample.
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TA B L E 5
Out-of-Sample Prediction Analysis of topic and Style
Panel A: AUC statistics (AAERs)
Prediction model AUC
Style 0.649∗∗∗
topic 0.680∗∗∗
topic and Style 0.708∗∗∗
Panel B: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (AAERs)
Style topic and Style
topic Diff. in AUC 0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
p-value (0.01) (0.00)
topic and Style Diff. in AUC 0.059∗∗∗
p-value (0.00)
Panel C: AUC statistics (AA irregularities)
Prediction model AUC
Style 0.581∗∗
topic 0.616∗∗
topic and Style 0.614∗∗
Panel D: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (AA irregularities)
Style topic and Style
topic Diff. in AUC 0.035∗ 0.002
p-value (0.06) (0.85)
topic and Style Diff. in AUC 0.033
p-value (0.13)
Panel E: AUC statistics (10-K/A irregularities)
Prediction model AUC
Style 0.663∗∗∗
topic 0.616∗∗∗
topic and Style 0.669∗∗∗
Panel F: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (10-K/A irregularities)
Style topic and Style
topic Diff. in AUC −0.047∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
p-value (0.00) (0.00)
topic and Style Diff. in AUC 0.007
p-value (0.27)
This table reports results from comparative out-of-sample tests of the prediction models based on vectors of topic and
textual style metrics (denoted as Style). The topic vector is comprised of measures capturing the proportion of a firm’s 10-
K filing devoted to discussing a particular theme. Section 3.2.2 describes how the topic proportions are derived. The set
of variables in the Style vector are defined in panel B of appendix B. Panels A, C, and E present statistics of the detection
performance of each model for the AAER sample and the Audit Analytics (AA) and 10-K/A irregularity samples, respectively.
The performance statistics are computed using pooled values of the area under the receiver operating classification curve
(AUC) generated by out-of-sample regressions ofmisreport on p misreport (derived by estimating eachmodel in rolling five-year
windows prior to the prediction year). The statistical significance of each AUC statistic is determined by assessing whether
the statistic is significantly greater than 0.50 (the AUC for a random classification model). The statistical significance is
determined by comparing the statistic against the AUCs produced using simulated random data bootstrapped and clustered
by year with 1,000 replications. Panels B, D, and F present non-parametric Wald tests of the differences in the AUCs for the
AAER, AA, and 10-K/A samples, respectively. The Wald tests are based on 1,000 bootstrap iterations with clustering by year.
Each panel reports test statistics and p-values (in parentheses) indicating whether the model specification in a given row is
significantly better at predicting misstatements out-of-sample compared to the model specification in the respective column
(two-tailed). The significance levels for all tests are denoted as follows: ∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗
denotes p < 0.10.
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TA B L E 6
Out-of-Sample Prediction Analysis of topic, F-score, and Style
Panel A: AUC statistics (AAERs)
Prediction model AUC
F-score and Style 0.719∗∗∗
topic, F-score, and Style 0.752∗∗∗
topic 0.680∗∗∗
topic and F-score 0.742∗∗∗
Panel B: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (AAERs)
F-score and Style topic, F-score, and Style
topic Diff. in AUC −0.040∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
p-value (0.04) (0.00)
topic and F-score Diff. in AUC 0.023∗∗∗ −0.009
p-value (0.01) (0.13)
topic, F-score, and Style Diff. in AUC 0.032∗∗∗
p-value (0.00)
Panel C: AUC statistics (AA irregularities)
Prediction model AUC
F-score and Style 0.606∗∗∗
topic, F-score, and Style 0.635∗∗∗
topic 0.610∗∗∗
topic and F-score 0.632∗∗∗
Panel D: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (AA irregularities)
F-score and Style topic, F-score, and Style
topic Diff. in AUC 0.010 −0.018
p-value (0.45) (0.14)
topic and F-score Diff. in AUC 0.026∗∗ −0.003
p-value (0.04) (0.80)
topic, F-score, and Style Diff. in AUC 0.028∗∗∗
p-value (0.01)
Panel E: AUC statistics (10-K/A irregularities>)
Prediction model AUC
F-score and Style 0.667∗∗∗
topic, F-score, and Style 0.670∗∗∗
topic 0.616∗∗∗
topic and Style 0.669∗∗∗
(Continued)
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TA B L E 6—Continued
Panel F: Pooled ROC AUC difference tests (10-K/A irregularities)
F-score and Style topic, F-score, and Style
topic Diff. in AUC −0.051∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
p-value (0.00) (0.00)
topic and Style Diff. in AUC 0.003 −0.001
p-value (0.59) (0.74)
topic, F-score, and Style Diff. in AUC 0.004
p-value (0.42)
This table reports results from comparative out-of-sample tests of the prediction models based on vectors
of topic, quantitative financial metrics (F-score), and textual style feature (Style). The topic vector is comprised
of measures capturing the proportion of a firm’s 10-K filing devoted to discussing a particular theme. Sec-
tion 3.2.2 describes how the topic measures are derived. The set of variables in the F-score and Style vectors
are defined in appendix B. Panels A, C, and E present statistics of the detection performance of each model
for the AAER sample and the Audit Analytics (AA) and 10-K/A irregularity samples, respectively. The per-
formance statistics are computed using pooled values of the area under the receiver operating classification
curve (AUC) generated by out-of-sample regressions of misreport on p misreport (derived by estimating each
model in rolling five-year windows prior to the prediction year). The statistical significance of each AUC
statistic is determined by assessing whether the statistic is significantly greater than 0.50 (the AUC for a ran-
dom classification model). The statistical significance is determined by comparing the statistic against the
AUCs produced using simulated random data bootstrapped and clustered by year with 1,000 replications.
Panels B, D, and F present nonparametric Wald tests of the differences in the AUCs for the AAER, AA, and
10-K/A samples, respectively. The Wald tests are based on 1,000 bootstrap iterations with clustering by year.
Each panel reports test statistics and p-values (in parentheses) indicating whether the model specification
in a given row is significantly better at predicting misstatements out-of-sample compared to the model spec-
ification in the respective column (two-tailed). The significance levels for all tests are denoted as follows:
∗∗∗ denotes p < 0.01, ∗∗ denotes p < 0.05, and ∗ denotes p < 0.10.
above the 0.50 threshold, ranging from 0.635 in the AA sample (panel C)
to as high as 0.752 in the AAER sample (panel A). The benchmarking tests
indicate that the addition of topic to the F-score and Style model improves
predictive accuracy by 3.2% for AAERs (Wald p-value = 0.00 in panel B)
and 2.8% for irregularity restatements (Wald p-value = 0.01 in panel D).
The incremental value of topic is insignificant in the 10-K/A sample when
we compare the three-vector model to the joint F-score and Style model. We
also find that the three-vector model does not perform any better than the
joint topic and F-score model in the AAER and AA samples (Wald p-value
= 0.13 and 0.80 in panels B and D) or the topic and Style model in the
10-K/A sample (Wald p-value = 0.74 in panel F). This evidence corrobo-
rates our previous results: topic and F-Score are strong predictors of AAERs
and restatements, whereas topic and Style provide robust power for detecting
broad misrepresentations and disclosure omissions.
4.3 THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF topic
We gauge the economic significance of our topic measure by examin-
ing the out-of-sample classification accuracy of our detection models at the
50th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the predicted probability scores. Fol-
lowing Dechow et al. [2011], we consider scores above the 50th percentile
as “above normal risk” and those above the 90th and 95th percentiles as
“high risk.” The accuracy rates for each prediction model are equivalent to
the true positive rate or sensitivity of the model at the various cutoffs. We
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compute these rates for each prediction year and report the average an-
nual percentage of misreported filings that are accurately classified by each
model at the respective percentile cutoff. We also report the total number
of misreported filings that are correctly classified at each cutoff.
In addition, we follow Bao et al. [2020] and use the Normalized Dis-
counted Cumulative Gain at the position k (NDCG@k) as an alternative
measure of classification accuracy, where k is the top 1% or 99th percentile
of the predicted probability scores. The NDCG@k measure uses a loga-
rithmic function to weight the ranks of the predicted scores from a given
model, such that the top prediction scores have higher values than lower
prediction scores. False positives receive a rank of zero. These weights are
then summed to arrive at the Discounted Cumulative Gain at the cutoff per-
centile k (denoted DCG@k). We set k at 1%, so that the predicted scores in
the ranking list represent the 99th percentile of the test sample in a given
prediction year. The DCG@k measure is further normalized to values rang-
ing from 0 to 1, to allow for comparisons of ranking quality across multi-
ple models.
Table 7 reports the percentage and number of filings that are correctly
classified as misreported using multiple models. Panel A reports results for
the AAER sample; panels B and C report results for the AA and 10-K/A sam-
ples, respectively. For the AAER sample, we find that the basic F-scoremodel
correctly classifies 72.51% of misreported filings at the 50th percentile cut-
off (total count of 319 filings). The joint model of topic and F-Score or,
alternatively, the three-vector model performs better, flagging about 79%
of misreported filings on average. When we focus on high-risk prediction
scores, we observe that the three-vector model captures the most misreport-
ing events at the 90th and 95th percentiles (32.90% and 22.44% or total
counts of 150 and 96 misreported filings, respectively).
To quantify the economic value of topic, we note that the classifica-
tion rate at the 95th percentile improves by 59% when topic is added to
the benchmark F-score and Style model (accuracy rate of 22.44% versus
14.11%).25 In terms of raw numbers, we capture 26 additional misreporting
firms at the 95th percentile when topic is added to the benchmark model.
This relative improvement is striking when we consider the low frequency
of AAER filings and the high costs associated with misreporting events
that are not detected by traditional prediction models (Beneish and Vorst
[2019]).26 The classification rate at the 90th percentile also increases by
36% when topic is added to the benchmark model (32.90% versus 24.28%).
25We determine the relative improvement in percentage terms by taking the change in the
classification accuracy rate and dividing through by the classification rate of the benchmark
model, that is, [(22.44 − 14.11)/14.11 = 59%]. We use the same approach when assessing
incremental value based on the NDCG@k statistic.
26 Beneish and Vorst [2019] estimate that investors suffer three-day return losses of $447
million for misreporting events that are not detected by models built using traditional finan-
cial statement variables.
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TA B L E 7
Out-of-Sample Classification Performance of topic
Panel A: Classification of AAERs
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 70.29 292 22.75 91 10.39 47 0.113
F-score 72.51 319 22.95 111 11.24 65 0.146
Style 65.73 273 14.60 62 6.78 35 0.079
topic and F-score 78.56 332 28.93 140 18.01 86 0.176
topic and Style 74.79 312 21.40 91 13.38 52 0.118
F-score and Style 76.42 329 24.28 117 14.11 70 0.163
topic, F-score, and Style 79.43 339 32.90 150 22.44 96 0.188
Panel B: Classification of AA irregularities
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 57.36 142 17.07 39 8.68 18 0.062
F-score 60.84 140 11.03 28 4.63 14 0.086
Style 55.67 136 15.04 33 7.79 19 0.096
topic and F-score 61.41 151 17.28 41 8.16 20 0.106
topic and Style 56.81 144 14.61 38 9.71 24 0.132
F-score and Style 53.26 132 12.05 29 6.44 17 0.106
topic, F-score, and Style 62.21 156 14.07 35 9.68 24 0.124
Panel C: Classification of 10-K/A irregularities
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 65.19 419 19.74 117 10.49 65 0.113
F-score 58.33 368 15.96 104 9.95 63 0.141
Style 69.68 453 25.54 165 14.06 91 0.079
topic and F-score 63.31 404 21.40 133 11.30 74 0.176
topic and Style 70.61 457 24.55 160 15.56 100 0.118
F-score and Style 69.60 451 26.72 174 15.94 98 0.172
topic, F-score, and Style 70.18 455 28.05 179 16.83 105 0.180
This table reports the classification accuracy of our prediction models using out-of-sample prediction
scores. Panel A reports the results for the AAER sample, whereas panels B and C present results for the
Audit Analytics (AA) and 10-K/A irregularity samples, respectively. In each panel, we report the average
annual percentage (%) and total number (Count) of misreported 10-K filings that are accurately classified
as misreported by each prediction model at the respective cutoffs at the 50th, 90th, and 95th percentiles
of the predicted probability scores. The final column of each panel presents the NDCG@k score for each
prediction model, where k is the 99th percentile or the top 1% of the predicted scores. The NDCG@k
measure evaluates the ranking quality of each prediction model and ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values
indicating greater classification performance.
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This increase leads to 33 more filings being correctly classified at this cut-
off. These findings corroborate our inference that topic is incrementally
valuable in detecting misreporting. The same interpretation holds when we
evaluate the detection rates at the 99th percentile based on the NDCG@k
measure. Here, the inclusion of topic in the three-vector model improves
detection accuracy by 15%, compared to the benchmark F-score and Style
model (0.188 versus 0.163).
Our results for the AA sample (panel B) further demonstrate the eco-
nomic value of our topic measure. We find that topic increases detection
accuracy by 50% at the 95th percentile cutoff when added to the bench-
mark model (classification accuracy of 9.68% versus 6.44%). We also ob-
serve that topic by itself or joint models of topic paired with F-score or Style
perform just as well or higher than the three-vector model at the 90th and
95th percentile cutoffs. Thus, there is little value in adding F-score or Style
as a third predictor of high-risk restatements, once topic is included in the
model. In panel C, the three-vector model is most efficient at detecting
high-risk events in the 10-K/A sample. For instance, the inclusion of topic
in the three-vector model improves classification accuracy by roughly 6% at
the 95th percentile cutoff when benchmarked against the joint F-score and
Style model (16.83% versus 15.94%). This improvement equates to an ad-
ditional seven filings being correctly classified as misreported. Collectively,
the results in table 7 suggest that the incremental predictive power of topic
is economically significant and that its value is quite salient when detecting
high-risk reporting practices.
Following prior studies (e.g., Dechow et al. [2011]), we further illustrate
the economic significance of our results by assessing the incremental value
of topic in detecting the Enron accounting scandal. We focus on the predic-
tion scores from the three-vector model to ensure that all possible predic-
tors are considered. The earliest out-of-sample year in our analysis is 1999.
Thus, we restrict our analysis to the 10-K filings issued by Enron in 1999 and
2000, that is, the misreported filings for fiscal 1998 and 1999, respectively.27
The three-vector model classifies Enron’s 1999 filing as misreported
based on a prediction score that ranks at the 93rd percentile across all fil-
ings issued in 1999. Two variables contribute the most to Enron’s prediction
score. The first is firm size (log of total assets), consistent with the notion
that large firms are more likely to attract SEC scrutiny (Files [2012]). The
second variable is the proportion of the 10-K filing devoted to discussing
year-over-year increases in income (combined topic 2). Interestingly,
Enron’s industry-normalized value for this topic proportion ranks at the
98th percentile. We further find that the 10-K filing issued by Enron in
2000 is classified as misreported at an even higher percentile (98.5). En-
ron’s discussion of income increases is again the biggest contributor to its
27 The enforcement actions against Enron cited material accounting violations for the 1997
to 2000 fiscal years. See SEC AAER Numbers 1640 and 1821.
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prediction score. But this time, the topic proportion is substantially lower
in the 2000 filing, ranking in just the second percentile, relative to indus-
try peers. This dramatic drop in the attention devoted to this topic could
reflect deliberate efforts by Enron executives to distract attention from soar-
ing (manipulated) earnings and the sources of its revenue growth.28,29
5. Extended Analyses and Robustness Tests
5.1 CONTROLLING FOR “REPEAT OFFENDERS”
Our rolling window procedure requires a misreporting event to be pub-
licly known by the end of the estimation window for the event to be in-
cluded in our in-sample estimations. (See earlier discussion in section
4.2.1.) There are no cases in our samples where the same misreporting
event affects multiple annual reports spanning both the in-sample estima-
tion window and the out-of-sample prediction year. Thus, the only way for
a misreporting firm to be included in both periods is for the firm to have
two or more unrelated misreporting events (i.e., at least one event appear-
ing in the estimation window and another separate event appearing in the
prediction year). Although such cases are due to unrelated misreporting
events, their inclusion raises the concern that our topic measure could be
biased toward identifying repeat offenders or certain types of firms, rather
than detecting variations in thematic content when firms misreport.
We alleviate this concern by imposing an additional sample restriction to
ensure that our prediction periods are closer to being out-of-sample with
respect to a given firm. Specifically, we remove misreporting firms from the
out-of-sample prediction period if misreport is set to 1 in any year during
the in-sample estimation window. That is, repeat offenders are retained in
the estimation period in a given rolling five-year window but excluded
from the sample in the prediction year. Note that this sample restric-
tion only affects the observations that appear in our out-of-sample tests;
the observations in the estimation windows are unchanged because repeat-
offender firms are retained in-sample.30
Table 8 reports the frequency of misreporting for our prediction years af-
ter removing repeat-offender firms. The sample adjustment is quite restric-
tive as we are left with a significantly smaller number of misreporting events
in the out-of-sample periods. We lose 64% of the AAER events across our
28 In a March 2001 Fortune article (McLean [2001]), then-CFO Andrew Fastow noted “com-
petitive reasons” when explaining Enron’s suppression of income sources in its financial
reports.
29We conduct a second case study of the AAER filed against Zale Corporation for the im-
proper capitalization of television advertising costs between 2004 and 2009 (SEC AAER No.
3270). The three-vector model correctly classifies Zales’ 10-K filings as misreported at the 97th
percentile and above in all years except 2004. The topics that contribute the most to Zales’
prediction score point to extensive discussion related to media and entertainment (combined
topic 20) and digital technology and services (combined topic 15). A manual review of the
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prediction years, resulting in a misreporting rate of 0.45% compared to the
1.41% reported in table 1 (a drop from 419 to 134 events for the 1999–2010
period). We also lose 61% of the events in the AA sample (from 234 to 92
events) and about 21% in the 10-K/A sample (from 648 to 518 events). The
out-of-sample misreporting rates for these two samples are also dramatically
lower at 0.46% and 1.51%, respectively. Thus, although the repeat-offender
restriction helps to alleviate identification concerns, it exacerbates the rel-
ative rarity of misreporting and, as a consequence, may lead to noisy model
predictions (Perols et al. [2017]).
We report replicated results for our economic significance tests in panels
A–C of table 9. The results are weaker, not surprisingly, due to the large
loss of misreporting events. Nonetheless, we continue to find evidence that
topic is incrementally valuable in detecting misreporting. Specifically, we ob-
serve in panel A that the joint topic and F-score model captures the highest
rate of AAER violations at the 90th and 95th percentile cutoffs (29.69%
and 17.20%, respectively). When benchmarked against the standalone F-
score model, we note that topic improves classification accuracy by 58% at
the 90th percentile (accuracy rate of 29.69% versus 18.83%) and by 71%
at the 95th (accuracy rate of 17.20% versus 10.04%). Although the Style
model dominates at the 90th percentile in the AA sample (panel B), the
joint topic and Style model captures the most restatements at the 95th per-
centile (7.05%), consistent with our results in table 7. The economic value
of topic is also salient in the restricted 10-K/A sample (panel C). Here the
three-vector model performs best in flagging high-risk observations at the
95th and 99th percentile cutoffs. In sum, the results in table 9 corroborate
our inferences regarding the economic value of disclosure topics in detect-
ing misreporting.
5.2 ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF IRREGULARITY RESTATEMENTS
We use a second approach to identify irregularities from the AA database
based on the types of accounting errors corrected by the restatement.
This approach mirrors the classification procedure used by Larcker and
Zakolyukina [2012] and Zakolyukina [2018]. In these studies, restatements
related to revenue recognition and serious core expense errors are treated
as irregularities, because these corrections are generally associated with
negative stock returns when revealed to investors (Palmrose, Richardson,
and Scholz [2004], Scholz [2008]). We therefore redefine our misreport
variable in the AA sample based on whether the restatement corrects a
phrases and sentences associated with these topics in Zales’ filings for 2004 to 2009 indicate
that the discussions pertained largely to advertising and marketing expenses.
30We refer back to panel B of figure 1 to illustrate this sample restriction. Assume that
the firm depicted in the figure had a third misreporting event in 1999. The firm would be
excluded from the out-of-sample prediction for 1999 because it had two misreporting events
over the preceding five-year window (1994–1998).
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TA B L E 9
Out-of-Sample Classification Performance of topic: Controlling for Repeat Offenders
Panel A: Classification of AAERs
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction Model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 65.37 92 15.90 21 2.47 7 0.076
F-score 68.41 109 18.83 37 10.04 23 0.141
Style 61.57 94 10.77 17 2.27 6 0.000
topic and F-score 67.19 106 29.69 42 17.20 26 0.162
topic and Style 68.87 103 11.22 20 3.09 9 0.076
F-score and Style 68.61 111 17.93 40 12.78 26 0.162
topic, F-score, and Style 67.62 108 27.65 44 12.04 24 0.172
Panel B: Classification of AA irregularities
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction Model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 48.03 48 9.45 9 5.49 5 0.000
F-score 53.54 53 7.09 8 2.91 4 0.000
Style 58.07 59 12.02 11 5.49 5 0.048
topic and F-score 44.73 45 8.40 9 2.91 4 0.079
topic and Style 44.46 46 10.19 10 7.05 7 0.048
F-score and Style 48.25 49 9.75 11 4.05 6 0.079
topic, F-score, and Style 48.81 51 8.40 9 5.48 6 0.079
Panel C: Classification of 10-K/A irregularities
50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile NDCG@k
Prediction Model % Count % Count % Count 99th
topic 64.02 361 18.13 95 9.57 52 0.087
F-score 57.89 321 15.82 89 9.53 52 0.112
Style 68.63 392 23.83 133 12.38 69 0.063
topic and F-score 62.46 348 19.35 108 10.33 58 0.070
topic and Style 69.21 392 22.15 127 13.98 77 0.081
F-score and Style 68.46 389 24.64 139 14.05 74 0.112
topic, F-score, and Style 68.37 388 24.47 137 14.37 79 0.130
This table reports the out-of-sample classification accuracy of our prediction models after removing mis-
reporting events by repeat-offender firms from the prediction years. We classify a firm as a repeat offender
if the firm has a misreporting event in both the estimation window and the respective prediction year. For
such cases, we remove the misreporting event from the prediction year, while retaining the events in the
estimation window. Panel A reports the results for the AAER sample, whereas panels B and C present re-
sults for the Audit Analytics (AA) and 10-K/A irregularity samples, respectively. In each panel, we report the
average annual percentage (%) and total number (Count) of misreported 10-K filings that are accurately
classified as misreported by each prediction model at the 50th, 90th, and 95th percentiles of the predicted
probability scores. The final column of each panel presents the NDCG@k score for each prediction model,
where k is the 99th percentile or the top 1% of the predicted probability scores. The NDCG@k measure
evaluates the ranking quality of each prediction model and ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating
greater classification performance.
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revenue recognition or serious core expense error.31 The alternative def-
inition identifies 1,751 misreported filings or 5.46% of the AA sample from
2000 to 2012.
The replicated results for the AA sample (not reported) are consistent
with our primary findings, though the performance of the prediction mod-
els is weaker overall. This decline in predictive ability could be attributable
to a higher proportion of immaterial errors being captured by our al-
ternative definition. (Only 59% of this sample is comprised of Big R re-
statements, compared to 73% in our primary sample.) Nonetheless, topic
continues to be economically important as classification accuracy for high-
risk observations significantly improves when topic is added to our bench-
mark models.
5.3 ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We conduct a series of sensitivity checks for our primary results. Our first
set of tests examines the sensitivity of our results to variations in the fre-
quency of misreporting events over our sample period and to the inclusion
of technical proxy amendments in our 10-K/A irregularity sample. We then
assess the usefulness of topic in detecting financial restatements attributable
to unintentional misapplications of GAAP (i.e., purely accounting errors).
Next, we reestimate topic using only narratives from the MD&A section, in-
stead of the full text of the 10-K filings. We also change the regression form
to a L1 regularized logit model to alleviate concerns of potential overfit-
ting. Lastly, we replicate our analyses using the raw topic proportions of each
filing (as opposed to the industry-normalized topic proportions) and an ex-
panded set of financial and textual style variables taken from prior studies
(Beneish [1997, 1999], Cecchini et al. [2010a, b]). The results from these
robustness tests are consistent with our reported evidence. We discuss each
test in appendix A.6 of the online appendix.
6. Conclusion
We employ a sophisticated machine learning tool to identify and quantify
what is being disclosed in annual report filings (as opposed to how it is being
disclosed). We then develop a unique measure, labeled topic, that quantifies
the thematic content of annual report filings and the attention devoted to
each topic. Drawing on the management disclosure and communications
literatures, we assess whether topic is incrementally informative in predict-
ing intentional misreporting, compared to standard financial and textual
style measures.
31 The serious core expense errors include cost of sales errors; liabilities, accounts payable,
and accrual estimation failures; and improper capitalization of expenditures. We find sim-
ilar results if we expand the list to include depreciation or amortization errors; improper
recording of payroll, selling, general, and administrative expenses; deferred stock-based and
executive compensation errors; and lease and leasehold errors.
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Using SEC AAERs and irregularities drawn from financial restatements
and annual filing amendments, we find that our topic measure provides
significant incremental predictive power over commonly used financial
statement and textual style measures. Specifically, out-of-sample prediction
models that incorporate topic outperform models based solely on financial
and textual measures. Further, our results reveal that topic is incrementally
and economically valuable in detecting above-normal and high-risk misre-
porting events, improving prediction accuracy by as much as 59% in the
case of SEC AAERs and 50% for irregularity restatements. Our results are
robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including alternative definitions of
topic, an alternative identification of irregularity restatements, time varia-
tions in misreporting, and additional financial and textual variables.
APPENDIX A
Identification of 10-K/A Irregularities
We conduct an automated text search of amended 10-K filings (10-K/As)
to identify material misrepresentations or disclosure omissions that are
seemingly intentional. We download and parse all 10-K/A filings from 1994
to 2012 available through the SEC EDGAR FTP site (see appendix A.1 of
the online appendix for our parsing methodology). We then use regular
expressions to search for specific phrases (in any capitalization) based on
the classification criteria set forth in Hennes, Leone, and Miller [2008]. If
no corresponding phrase is found, we categorize the filing amendment as
stemming from an unintentional reporting problem. The search phrases
for each classification criterion are laid out below. The “∗” symbol indicates
truncated words, whereas “ . . . ” indicates the inclusion of other text.
1. Variants of the words “fraud” or “irregularity”: “ . . . fraud∗ . . . ,” “ . . .
irregular∗ . . . ,” “ . . . materially false and misleading . . . ,” “ . . . violat∗
of federal securities laws . . . ,” “ . . . violat∗ securities exchange act . . . ”
2. Presence of related SEC or Department of Justice (DOJ) investi-
gations: “ . . . sec . . . investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . . sec . . . ,”
“ . . . securities and exchange commission . . . investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . .
investigat∗ . . . securities and exchange commission . . . ,” “ . . . doj . . .
investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . . doj . . . ,” “ . . . department of jus-
tice . . . investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . . department of justice
. . . ,” “ . . . attorney general . . . investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . .
attorney general . . . ,” “ . . . u∗s∗ attorney . . . investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . .
investigat∗ . . . u∗s∗ attorney . . . ”
3. Presence of related independent investigations: “ . . . forensic
account∗ . . . ,” “ . . . forensic investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . independent∗ . . .
investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . . independent . . . ,” “ . . . retain∗
. . . special legal counsel . . . ,” “ . . . audit committee . . . retain∗ . . . ,”
“ . . . retain∗ . . . audit committee . . . ,” “ . . . audit committee . . .
investigat∗ . . . ,” “ . . . investigat∗ . . . audit committee . . . ,” “ . . . for-
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mer independent auditors . . . ,” “ . . . forensic or other account∗ . . . ,”
“ . . . retain∗ . . . independent legal counsel . . . ”
A P P E N D I X B
Variable Definitions
Panel A: Quantitative financial statement and stock return variables
Variable Definition
log(Total Assets) Log of total assets
RSST Accruals The sum of changes in working capital accruals, long-term operating
assets, and long-term operating liabilities, scaled by total assets;
following Richardson et al. [2005]
Receivables Change in accounts receivable scaled by average total assets
Inventory Change in inventory scaled by average total assets
%Soft Assets Percent of total assets excluding PP&E and cash and cash equivalents
Cash Sales Percentage change in cash sales, where cash sales is measured as
total sales minus the change in accounts receivable
Return On Assets Change in income before tax, scaled by average total assets
Actual Issuance An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm issued debt or equity
securities during the year, 0 otherwise
Operating Leases An indicator variable coded as 1 if future operating lease obligations
are greater than zero, 0 otherwise
Book-To-Market The ratio of total common equity to the market value of equity,
where market value is computed as total common shares
outstanding multiplied by closing share price at the fiscal year end
Lag(Mkt −
Ad jRe tur n)
The previous fiscal year’s annual buy-and-hold return inclusive of
delisting returns minus the annual buy-and-hold value-weighted
market return for the same period
Merger An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm completed a merger or
acquisition during the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise
Big N Auditor An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm was audited by a Big N
auditor in the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise.
Mid-size Auditor An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm was audited by a mid-size
auditor (BDO, Grant Thornton, or McGladrey) during the
current fiscal year, 0 otherwise.
TotFinancing Net cash flow from financing activities, scaled by average total assets
ExanteFinancing An indicator variable coded as 1 if cash flow from operations minus
the prior three year average of capital expenditures, scaled by total
current assets is less than −0.5, 0 otherwise
Restructuring An indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm reported nonzero
restructuring charges during the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise
(Continued)
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A P P E N D I X B—Continued
Panel B: Textual style variables
Variable Definition
log (Bulle ts) Log of the number of bullets used in the 10-K filing
Header The number of characters in the SEC header of the 10-K filing
Newlines The number of excess newlines in the 10-K filing
Tags The length of all HTML tags used in the 10-K filing
Parsed Size The number of characters in the 10-K filing after parsing (see
appendix A.1 of the online appendix for the parsing
methodology)
Sentence Length Mean sentence length in words
Word Stddev Standard deviation of word length
Paragraph Stddev Standard deviation of paragraph length
Repetitions The mean number of times each sentence is repeated in the parsed
10-K filing
Sentence Stddev Standard deviation of sentence length
Type Token Ratio A measure of vocabulary variation defined as UW
W
, where UW is the
number of unique words in the document and W is the total
number of words in the document
Coleman-Liau Index The Coleman-Liau Index measured as 5.88 × C
W
− 29.6 × S
W
− 15.8,
where C is the total number of characters in the document
(excluding spacing and punctuation), W is the total number of
words, and S is the total number of sentences
Fog The Gunning Fog Index measured as 0.4
(
W
S
+ 100 × W ′
W
)
, where W ′
is the number of complex words (three or more syllables) in the
document
%Active Voice The percentage of sentences written in active voice
%Passive Voice The percentage of sentences written in passive voice
%Negative The percentage of negative words in the document based on the
Loughran and McDonald [2011] dictionary
%Positive The percentage of positive words in the document based on the
Loughran and McDonald [2011] dictionary
All Caps The number of words in all capital letters with at least two letters
Exclamation Points The number of exclamation points in the parsed 10-K filing
Question Marks The number of question marks in the parsed 10-K filing
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